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Abstract 
 
Office space in Britain is the most expensive in the world and regulatory constraints 
are the obvious explanation. We estimate the ‘regulatory tax’ for 14 British office 
locations from 1961 to 2005. These are orders of magnitude greater than estimates 
for Manhattan condominiums or office space in continental Europe. Exploiting the 
panel data, we provide strong support for our hypothesis that the regulatory tax 
varies according to whether an area is controlled by business interests or residents. 
Our results imply that the cost of the 1990 change converting commercial property 
taxes from a local to a national basis – transparently removing any fiscal incentive to 
permit local development – exceeded any plausible rise in local property taxes.  
 
 
JEL classification: H3, J6, Q15, R52. 
Keywords: Land use regulation, regulatory costs, business taxation, office markets.
Office space supply restrictions in Britain: the political economy of market revenge 
 
1 
1 Introduction: The Problem in an International Perspective1 
 
The cost of constructing a m2 of office space in Birmingham, England, in 2004 was 
approximately half that in Manhattan2. This is not very surprising since Birmingham 
is a struggling, medium sized city on the flat plains of the British Midlands and 
Manhattan is big, topographically constrained, prosperous and highly dynamic. If we 
were looking for an American equivalent to Birmingham, maybe, St Louis, Missouri 
would pop up. When we couple the cost of construction with the costs of occupation 
of that same m2, however, we do get a shock. In the same year, the total occupation 
costs per m2 were 44 percent higher in Birmingham than they were in Manhattan 
(KingSturge, 2004).  Something very odd must be going on. The obvious anomaly is 
the intensity and restrictiveness of land use controls in the UK and this paper sets out 
to investigate the economic costs of these restrictions and what drives them. 
 
In the past few years US urban economists have become interested in the analysis of 
land use regulation and concerned about increasing regulatory restrictions influencing 
the supply and costs of housing3 and perhaps sorting between cities4. Glaeser et al 
(2005) for example conclude that regulatory restrictions increase housing prices in the 
most tightly constrained metro areas by some 50 percent and by considerably more in 
Manhattan. This is potentially of concern because not only is the effective tax 
substantial but it has been rising over time. However, no researcher has yet reported a 
significant effect of regulatory constraint on the costs of commercial space in the US. 
This is no great surprise given the fiscal incentives to local communities to allow 
commercial development. 
 
The situation in the UK, however, is several orders of magnitudes more restricted. 
This is partly because land use regulation in the UK takes the form of universal 
growth constraints: and growth constraints applied not just to the total area of urban 
land take for each city but individually to each category of land use within each city. 
So urban ‘envelopes’ are fixed by growth boundaries but within these envelopes the 
area of land available for retail, offices, warehouses and industry is all tightly 
controlled. Although not entirely inflexible, Greenbelts surrounding cities have been 
more or less sacrosanct since they were established, out of town retail is effectively 
prohibited5, and local planning authorities have been extremely reluctant to expand 
the area zoned for commercial space. There are, moreover, a raft of preservation 
designations and height controls on buildings. The present pattern of regulation was 
essentially set in aspic in 1947 so has been in place for two generations. 
                                                 
1 We thank Robin Goodchild, Colin Lizieri, Tsur Somerville and John Clapp for helpful comments and 
suggestions. We are grateful to Robin Goodchild courtesy of Jones Lang LaSalle, Peter Damesick from 
UK CB Richard Ellis and Simon Rawlinson from Davis Langdon for kindly providing data. Gerard 
Dericks provided excellent research assistance. The remaining errors are the sole responsibility of the 
authors. 
2 This uses the ratio of Birmingham office construction costs to those in London from Davis Langdon 
(see Section 3 of this paper), the ratio of Davis Langdon’s London construction cost estimates to those 
from Gardiner and Theobald to apply to Gardiner and Theobald’s construction cost data for New York 
offices to estimate figures on a comparable basis for both Birmingham and New York. 
3 See, for example, Brueckner (2000); Evenson and Wheaton (2003); Glaeser and Gyourko (2003); 
Glaeser et al (2005); Mayer and Somerville (2000); Mayo and Sheppard (2001); Phillips and Goodstein 
(2000); or Song and Knaap (2003). 
4 See Gyouko et al (2005). 
5 On two different grounds: to maintain the economic strength of city centres and to reduce car use. 
Whether either objective is actually served by this policy and, in so far as it is, at what cost – is unclear. 
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Any reluctance of local communities to allow expansion of commercial space may be 
at least significantly explained by the fact that they have strong tax incentives not to. 
Taxes on commercial real estate (the business rate) accrue to national not local 
government (and account for some 5 percent of national tax revenues) but local 
authorities have to provide services to commercial property. The only interesting (and 
for us, useful) exception is the City of London which, when the ‘Uniform Business 
Rate’ (UBR) was introduced, was granted a unique exception and allowed to retain up 
to 15 percent of revenues raised. In addition to the property tax implications, there are 
other costs to local voters associated with development. Together, these generate very 
strong NIMBY pressures. As the retiring political head of the planning authority for 
one of the office locations analysed in this paper said when asked what had been his 
major achievement in office:  
[our main achievement was that] “…not a single new major office development 
has been approved. We managed to keep development down.” (Reading 
Chronicle, 1989).  
As we argue below, with the important and helpful exceptions of the City of London 
and London Docklands, the only incentive for local communities to permit 
commercial real estate development is local voters’ fears of unemployment. 
A further factor is that constraints and growth controls in the UK have been being 
applied since 1947. The nearest equivalent form of regulation in the USA, in Portland 
Oregon, still much less restrictive than applies in the UK, has been in force only since 
1973. Because regulatory constraints only affect new construction (at least directly – 
as we see in the UK they produce strong incentives, if tight enough, to induce 
conversion of older stock to denser occupation) they only influence real estate prices 
progressively over time. As was noted in Cheshire and Sheppard (2005) their impact 
on housing prices only began to be observable from about ten years after they were 
introduced, that is from 1955 or so. 
The result is that the economic effects of land use regulation are orders of magnitude 
greater in the UK than they are in the US. Using data for 1984 and with quite 
conservative assumptions, Cheshire and Sheppard (2002) estimated that the net 
welfare costs6 of restrictions on land supply in a prosperous community in southern 
England, Reading, were equivalent to nearly 4 percent as an annual income tax. In 
2003, at the outer boundary of permitted development in Reading, housing land was 
some £3,000,000 per hectare (Cheshire and Sheppard, 2005). A few feet away 
agricultural land, not within the urban envelope, was worth perhaps £7,500 per 
hectare. As Muellbauer (2005) commented, such price distortions are ‘grotesque’. The 
constraints on the housing market have become so significant that the British Treasury 
and the Department of Communities and Local Government (formerly the Office of 
the Deputy Prime Minister) have now commissioned two separate enquiries (Barker, 
2003; 2004 and 2006a and b). 
Office space in London (KingSturge, 2003 to 2005) is not just more expensive than 
anywhere else in the world; it is some three times as expensive as the next most 
                                                 
6 Net in the strict sense that benefits were also quantified and so the measure was the excess value of 
total costs over benefits expressed in terms of equivalent income variation. 
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expensive city in Europe, Paris, and more than three times as expensive as in 
Manhattan. Even more telling, perhaps, are the costs of office space in British 
provincial cities. Birmingham was the next most expensive European city after Paris, 
and Glasgow, Edinburgh and Manchester were all more expensive than Manhattan; 
office space costs almost twice as much in any of those smaller and not very 
prosperous British cities as it does in San Francisco – a city which not only is highly 
prosperous and has some of the tightest regulatory constraints on housing in the US 
but also has topographical constraints on land supply. Office space in Birmingham 
cost 124 percent more than in fast growing, twice as big and land strapped Singapore. 
The story in the retail sector seems to be even more extreme. The most important 
determinants of land prices in a city, in the absence of regulatory restrictions, will be 
the size of the city and its income level. Other factors, such as differences in expected 
rates of urban growth, topography and transport systems, may also play a part, as will 
environmental qualities or the quality of local public goods such as schools and 
security (see, for example, Gyourko and Tracey, 1991). So if we want to find a 
worthwhile indicator of the role of regulatory restrictions we should try to standardise 
for such differences. Cheshire and Sheppard (1986) provided evidence on land prices 
in US comparator cities, matched as closely as possible with UK cities (Reading and 
Darlington) for all except environmental and local public goods. Land prices for all 
use classes (except industry in deindustrialising Darlington) were orders of magnitude 
higher in the two UK cities. The most extreme case was the most expensive retail land 
in the prosperous UK city (Reading) compared to its US counterpart (Stockton, CA). 
In Reading the most sought after land available for retail use cost almost 250 times as 
much per acre as its equivalent in Stockton. 
To date there has been rigorous quantification of the economic effects of land use 
constraints on the UK housing sector but not for any category of commercial property. 
The purpose of this paper is to address this gap in our knowledge and investigate the 
costs of land use regulation for commercial property in the UK in a rather more 
rigorous way than is possible when just comparing the rent and occupation cost data  
provided by real estate intermediaries.  
An obvious problem in analysing the economic impacts of land use planning is 
identifying exactly what element in total occupation costs – the cost of space to 
economic agents - may reasonably be attributed to ‘planning’ restrictions. This is 
because i) such restrictions take many forms over and beyond restricting the supply of 
land or space; and ii) it is difficult to offset for the normal factors such as city size etc, 
that urban economic theory tells one should be expected to influence the price of land 
and space.  Furthermore, if we want to estimate the economic impact of any measured 
increase in space costs resulting from regulation, we would need to go a second step – 
not included in this research. We should estimate the impact on output, employment 
and incomes generated by the increase in space costs produced by regulatory 
constraints. Then offset those costs against any benefits regulation produced. 
 
In the context of the residential sector, a theoretically rigorous methodology was set 
out in Cheshire and Sheppard (2002) for estimating both the gross and the net costs of 
regulatory restrictions on the supply of residential land and so the net welfare cost 
these had. This involved estimating implicit prices for housing and garden space and 
planning produced amenities; then by matching these to a household income survey, 
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estimating both the structure of demand for these housing and planning ‘goods’ and 
the indirect utility function of households. If it was assumed that urban housing 
markets were in equilibrium (for which there was reasonable empirical evidence) 
these could be combined to estimate the de facto supply of space released by the 
planning system within the housing market concerned (Reading) since equilibrium 
requires that all available space be consumed. It was then possible to estimate via the 
indirect utility function and estimated demand system, the impact on welfare, in terms 
of equivalent variation in incomes, of changes in the supply of both planning 
amenities and housing space consequent on a more - or less - restrictive supply of 
urban space and consequent supply of planning amenities. Because the analysis built 
up from observations of individual households it was also possible to estimate the 
distributional consequences of land supply restrictions and the trade-off between 
planning produced amenities and private space.   
 
This, however, is demanding on data and research time and depends on being able to 
explicitly identify and estimate the economic impacts of the goods/amenities 
generated by planning, the impact of regulation on supply and the indirect utility 
functions of residents/citizens. Even if it were not so data intensive, it is not clear such 
a methodology could be adapted to estimating the economic and welfare impacts of 
regulation of the supply of non-residential property because of the difficulty - perhaps 
impossibility - of estimating the relevant production function.  
 
We estimate here, just the first of these elements: a measure of the total cost of 
regulatory constraints on the price of office space expressed as a ‘tax’ – that is as a 
percentage of construction costs. To do this we adapt the methodology first developed 
and applied to the Manhattan condominium market by Glaeser et al (2005). The value 
of this measure and its interpretation is the subject of section 2 of this paper. The 
Glaeser et al (2005) methodology has the considerable attraction that it is 
intellectually coherent, resting on established microeconomic theory, and it is not too 
demanding with respect to data and estimation techniques. Its downside is that it is a 
‘black box’ number in that it does not differentiate between costs that are imposed by 
different aspects of regulation and may miss certain types of cost that regulation 
imposes. It is an aggregate measure of the gross cost of regulatory constraints limiting 
the height of buildings and – more indirectly – the supply of land for the use in 
question. So it reflects the costs of restrictions on land supply, space by floor area 
ratios or height restrictions, or common forms of conservation designation. It does 
not, however, capture costs imposed by compliance complexity or delays in decision 
making. In addition, it only gives a ‘cost’ not a net welfare or net impact on output 
measure. As is well known, there are measurable benefits from some aspects of 
regulation and, since space is substitutable to a degree in both production and 
consumption, the effects on output or welfare can only be estimated if both the 
benefits and the extent of substitutability are known. So the regulatory tax estimates 
are a lower bound estimate of a gross cost of land use regulation in any location. 
 
Glaeser et al (2005) report their results for Manhattan apartments as a price to 
construction cost ratio (rather than as a quasi-tax rate; regulatory tax to construction 
cost). For the most recent year they had data for, 2002, this ratio was 2.07. In our tax-
rate measure, this would translate to a value of 1.07. They also investigated other data 
which suggested that the value of the regulatory tax on housing was higher in some 
West Coast urban areas, such as the Bay Area and Los Angeles, than it was in the 
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New York urban area as a whole (it was much higher in Manhattan itself than it was 
in the New York metro area) although it was still substantial in the New York area. 
However, in 10 of the 21 urban areas investigated there was no measurable impact of 
regulation on house prices. Nor was there any indication of a ‘regulatory tax’ on 
office property in Manhattan. This provides some standard against which to evaluate 
the results for office property in the British cities reported below. 
 
2 An Interpretation of the Regulatory Tax (RT) as a Measure of the  
Costs of Restrictions 
 
The key idea of the Regulatory Tax (RT) approach is simple; in a world with 
competition among property developers and free market entry and exit (both 
reasonable assumptions), price will equal (minimum) average cost since this includes 
‘normal’ profit. Marginal cost rises with building height, so in the absence of 
restrictions on heights, buildings should rise to a point where the marginal cost of 
adding an additional floor equals its market price. If building higher is less profitable 
per m2 than building over a greater area, we still should expect the marginal cost of an 
extra floor to be equal to price: buildings would just be lower on average but the 
overall urban land take would be greater. Bertaud and Brueckner (2005) demonstrate 
the formal equivalence of height restrictions compared to land supply restrictions. 
Any gap between the observed market price and the marginal construction cost can be 
interpreted, therefore, as a ‘regulatory tax’ – the additional cost of space resulting – in 
aggregate – from the system of regulation in that particular market. If the sales price 
of an additional floor of office space exceeded the marginal cost of building this 
additional floor then developers would have an arbitrage opportunity. The difference 
between the price of floor space and its cost of construction must be due to some form 
of regulation.  
 
This is illustrated in Figure 1 which depicts the cost curves of representative 
competitive developers in (by assumption) two unregulated markets; one relatively 
prosperous and ‘attractive’ office market, say, London (L) and one less prosperous 
and ‘attractive’ market, say, Birmingham (B). For illustrative convenience, we assume 
that the marginal (construction) cost curve is identical in both markets implying that 
wages, materials and other variable costs do not vary regionally. We also assume – 
quite reasonably – that buildings of a given type have an optimal floor plan to height 
ratio (given the price of land).  
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Figure 1: A Developer’s Cost Curves without Space Restrictions 
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In a competitive market P=MC=AC and is given. The demand curve that the firm 
faces is flat. The regulatory tax RT is P-MC=0 in both cases.  
 
In Figure 2, we illustrate the economic rent of land for the two markets. 
 
Figure 2: Land Rent 
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Figure 2 additionally depicts the average variable cost curve, AVC, which covers all 
inputs except land. The average cost curves, AC, additionally include the costs of the 
fixed factor, land. The differences between the price and the average variable costs at 
the optimal building height can be interpreted as land rents (subject to site preparation 
and infrastructure costs). The illustrated cost curves imply that building heights will 
be higher, and so MC will be also higher, in London. Underlying ‘pure’ land values 
are relevant in the sense that, given different input costs, the optimal capital to land 
ratio will be different in different markets. The land rent is greater for London than for 
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Birmingham so buildings are higher but the difference in land rents between the two 
markets does not affect the value of the RT. In the absence of restrictions, RT will be 
zero. This, indeed, is on of the attractions of the RT measure. Since land costs are an 
element in fixed costs, they never affect the measured RT. Since land costs are 
difficult to measure and it is considerably more difficult still to estimate any impact of 
land use regulation on the cost of land, the RT measure of the costs of regulation 
entirely avoids a difficult problem. 
 
We can think about this in more detail by considering two cases. Case F is the 
unregulated situation while Case R is the regulated one.  
 
Case F: Suppose we have an unregulated world with a competitive development and 
office market and the cost of an additional floor rises with building height: then 
building heights rise until, per m2 Marginal Cost of Construction (MC)=Marginal 
Revenue(MR)=Average Cost of Construction (AC)=Price(P)=Average Revenue 
(AR). In such a market, therefore, the price per m2 includes all costs for a given 
building: construction + land + normal profit. Suppose we then add a hypothetical 
additional floor. The MC per m2 is higher for this additional floor than for the existing 
highest floor but price is not. The ‘land’ is already paid for in the existing building, 
part of fixed costs and included in AC. There is, then, no appreciable RT.  
 
Now consider the regulated world of Case R in which there is a constraint on building 
heights. We have an existing building and a competitive development and office 
market, but it is no longer true that building heights rise to the point at which 
MC=MR. They could profitably be higher but this profit is capitalised into the price 
paid for land so profits are still ‘normal’. Land is a fixed cost included, therefore, in 
average costs. If we now add a hypothetical floor to an existing building, there is no 
extra land cost – these are already ‘paid for’ in the existing building and included in 
AC. The marginal cost is only the extra construction cost but the price reflects the 
constrained supply, now without land rents having to be paid for, so price exceeds 
MC and the difference represents the gross cost of regulation - or the RT. This is 
illustrated in Figure 3. 
 
Figure 3: A Developer’s Cost Curves with Height Restrictions (London only) 
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The fact that the price of the extra space in Case R is higher has nothing to do with 
paying for the land but reflects the constraint, including scarcity of space. Although 
the RT measure eliminates the impact of land costs in the current regulated market 
conditions if the market were unregulated land costs per m2 would be lower: so the 
observed MC in a regulated market will differ from those in an unregulated market. 
 
However, not all regulatory constraints are as simple as height restrictions. There may 
be cases where the specific form of the regulations influences the costs of construction 
and the shape of the cost curves. Take an extreme example of hypothetical land use 
regulations. Suppose there were no controls on building heights but rigid controls on 
the amount of land made available for (office) construction and rigid constraints on 
the size of the floor plan relative to the size of the site. In such a situation there would 
still be a market demand for total office space and building heights would still rise 
until the point at which MC=AC=P. So estimated RT would be zero.  
 
This would not mean, however, that the regulatory system imposed no costs. Since 
costs per floor rise with the number of floors, to get a given total quantity of space, 
buildings would have to be much higher so the AC and MC curves would, in effect, 
be shifted to the left and upwards. To provide 36,000 m2 of space (a large office 
building) with a floor plan of 1,200 m2 would imply a 30 storey building and so a 
height of, say, 100 metres: to get the same space if the restriction allowed only 25m2 
per floor would imply 1,440 stories – a building some 4.75 kilometres high. 
 
Now consider another extreme of hypothetical regulation: suppose that there are no 
constraints on building or land availability at all, but stringent compliances costs 
related to, say, permits, but such costs are a function only of individual buildings. 
Once the compliance process has been completed, the agreed building can be 
constructed with no further compliance costs at all. In such a case, the costs of 
compliance will appear as a fixed cost and, if the results related to the incidence of 
Impact Fees are applicable (Ihlanfeldt and Shaughnessy, 2004) will be fully 
capitalised into land prices. Thus, there could be no impact on marginal costs or on 
the price of space. There will be a deadweight loss, but this loss will fall uniquely on 
the price of land although given that the profitability of transferring land from 
agricultural to urban use will be reduced it could reduce the overall supply of urban 
land and so have some affect on space costs. 
 
What these examples suggest is that the relationship between measured RT and the 
actual gross costs of regulation (if these could be measured exactly) is, in principle, a 
variable one and will depend on the precise form the regulatory constraints take. So 
long as at least an element of the regulatory constraints takes the form of restrictions 
on the height of buildings, however, for those types of uses in which vertical space is 
a more or less perfect substitute for horizontal space, the measured RT will be 
strongly and positively correlated with the actual gross costs of regulatory constraints. 
The RT measure will, however, be a lower bound estimate of the gross costs because, 
for example, some of the regulatory constraints may relate to compliance costs or 
costs of delay. 
 
Need this concern us particularly in the case of British offices? Restrictions on 
building heights take several forms but are applied in all British markets. In the City 
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of London, for example, no less than eight separate ‘view corridors’ of St Paul’s 
cathedral (both foreground and background) are protected from building above some 
55 metres and five ‘view corridors’ of the Monument are similarly protected as are 
four street blocks around the Monument (City of London, 1991). There are, in 
addition, extensive ‘Conservation Areas’ within which very limited changes to the 
external appearance of buildings is possible – obviously including height - and, 
throughout the City – as in all British cities – there are floor area ratio restrictions, 
known in the UK as ‘plot ratios’. These are set at 5.1:1 in the City (City of London, 
1991, para. 16.42). There are, in addition, other regulations affecting the design of 
buildings which limit height and space within them. Planning policies in London’s 
West End are substantially more restrictive than those in the City, since very large 
areas – most of Mayfair and Belgravia – are designated Conservation Areas where it 
is not possible to build higher than the existing structure, where external, and if the 
buildings are listed (which many are) even internal, alterations are prohibited7. Such 
historic conservation regulations undoubtedly generate amenity values, not included 
in a measure of RT.  
  
In summary, then, the RT measure of the gross costs of regulatory constraints on 
buildings is something of a black box in that it will incorporate the cost of restrictions 
on the supply of land for the use in question and restrictions on building heights. 
These may arise from various sources but are imposed in all British office locations 
by ‘plot ratio’ controls (‘floor area ratios’ in the US). Since land use planning is a 
national system in Britain it seems likely that compliance costs and costs of delay do 
not vary significantly across locations but such costs will not be fully captured in the 
RT measure and may not be captured at all. So we can conclude that estimated RT 
values will be strongly and positively correlated with actual gross costs of regulatory 
constraints but in absolute terms are likely to be lower bound estimates. 
 
3  Data and methodology 
 
Here we discuss the data used to estimate regulatory tax values. The total 
unemployment rate and service employment growth rate data used in the subsequent 
analysis are discussed in Section 6 and Appendix G. To estimate the RT we need 
‘price’ and ‘marginal construction cost’ data. Our empirical analysis builds on the best 
available data for the British office market and a number of continental European 
cities. After careful and detailed discussion to agree how best to measure marginal 
costs of construction (i.e., the estimated cost of adding an additional hypothetical floor 
to an existing building) Davis Langdon estimated time-series data for the agreed 
definitions by market (per square foot or square metre). Davis Langdon are the 
leading UK producers of construction cost data for the building industry and produce 
the Spon Handbooks used by quantity surveyors and architects (Davis Langdon 
2005). See Appendix A for a detailed description of the methodology Davis Langdon 
used to derive the marginal cost of construction. Gardiner and Theobald (2006) – 
Davis Langdon’s major competitor – provide (average) construction cost data for our 
sample of continental European cities. Unfortunately, comparable time-series data on 
                                                 
7 An interesting outcome in the very high end of the residential market in London’s West End is a very 
restricted supply of large floor plan flats. Listed building designation is applied even to internal 
connecting doors between adjoining structures so it is impossible to construct flats with larger floor 
plans than existing 18th and 19th Century structures. The result is a large premium per square metre for 
the few large floor plan flats available. 
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the market price of office space in the sense of capital values is not readily available, 
only data on rents, yields and rent free periods can be obtained. CB Richard Ellis, 
CBRE, the largest property consultancy in the UK, provided the relevant data for 
British markets. Similar data (although estimated on a different basis) were also 
provided by Jones Lang LaSalle (JLL) for a number of our British locations and all 
the continental European ones we report estimates for. We used the common British 
locations to make the best adjustment we can to a common basis.  
 
Only rental not capital values are available because office buildings are treated as 
income producing assets that are typically leased floor by floor. Given this 
complication, we need to impute the market price per m2 of an additional floor of 
office space (the ‘capitalised value’) using the available information on rents, yields, 
rent-free periods and vacancy rates. The estimation procedure is briefly described 
below and explained in more detail in Appendices B to D. Since we do not observe 
transaction prices but must rely on estimates, we carry out a quite extensive sensitivity 
analysis using the most ‘conservative’ and ‘radical’ assumptions which are defensible 
to estimate capital values. These provide a range of estimates although most of the 
discussion is in terms of what we regard as a relatively conservative, ‘central’ 
estimate. Finally, we provide some more tentative estimates for the regulatory tax 
imposed on office space in some continental European cities for which there are data 
from JLL and Gardiner and Theobald. 
 
Our data for the RT estimates for British office locations come from four different 
sources. CBRE (which incorporates the former CB Hillier Parker and before that 
Hillier Parker, the first agency to publish rental and yield data including the Investors 
Chronicle Hillier Parker reports) provided us with (headline) prime rents and 
equivalent yield and rent-free period data for 14 office locations in the UK (see Table 
1 for a list of the markets). Both time-series cover all 14 local markets. Most time-
series go back to 1973 with two series (those for the City of London and London West 
End) reaching back to 1960. CBRE also provided us with total occupation cost data, 
although only for 2004 and 2005 and for 8 of the 14 relevant markets. We obtained 
the matching marginal construction cost data for all 14 markets from Davis Langdon, 
based on actual construction projects in those markets also going back to 1961. 
Finally, we obtained regional vacancy rate information from the Office of the Deputy 
Prime Minister (ODPM) and national rental void data from IPD.  
 
The data for the RT estimates for European office locations come from two additional 
sources. JLL provided us with prime rent and equivalent yield data from 1990 to 2005 
(continental European cities) and for 1987 to 2005 (British cities). These allow us to 
compute hypothetical capital values (so called ‘Peter Pan values’) based on the 
assumption that the buildings are permanently renewed. Unfortunately, JLL could not 
provide us with matching information on voids or vacancies, so we use the ratio of the 
CBRE to JLL estimated values where we have common locations (for six British 
locations) to obtain as comparable a set of capital values for all locations, British and 
continental European. Gardiner and Theobald’s (2006) ‘International Construction 
Cost Survey’ provides average (as opposed to marginal) construction cost data back 
to 1999 so we can estimate RT values from 1999 to 2005. We use the ratio of 
marginal to average costs from Davis Langdon and Gardiner and Theobald to estimate 
the hypothetical marginal cost of construction for the continental European office 
locations. More detail is given in Appendix E. 
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Imputing Missing Values 
Our raw data come in different time-intervals. The prime rent data, for example, are 
quarterly for the City of London and London’s West End back to 1960; however, they 
are quarterly, monthly, half-annually and annually for the other 12 markets, in all but 
three cases, back to 1973. Similarly, the yield data come in various time intervals. The 
construction cost data are annual. Hence, in order to make our data comparable, we 
use annual numbers when available and compute annual numbers (averages from the 
available monthly, quarterly or half-annual data) when not. 
 
Even though we use annualised data, we still have missing values for a number of 
variables and markets. For example, we only obtained rent-free period data for two 
markets (the City of London and London’s West End) and only between 1993 and 
2006. For the remaining years and other markets we need to impute the rent-free 
periods using the available data (see Appendix B for details). Similarly, we need to 
impute equivalent yields prior to 1973 using the available data. The methodology is 
described in Appendix C. The imputed values obviously introduce an additional 
degree of uncertainty into estimates prior to 1972 (1972 Hillier Parker yields were 
available and these are believed to be comparable to the CBRE data series). We also 
have to impute vacancy rates from relatively short time-series of regional data from 
ODPM and longer time-series data from IPD. The methodology is described in more 
detail in Appendix D. Imputing values of yields could, we believe, have a significant 
impact on the final estimates of RT. So we should be very cautious with respect to any 
interpretation of estimated values of the regulatory tax or trends in that tax prior to 
1972. The absolute differences to estimates resulting from any plausible alternative 
values of rent free periods and vacancy rates are, however, comparatively small. We 
are confident, therefore, that while the need to impute values for such data is not 
entirely satisfactory, the additional margin of error it may introduce into the estimates 
is small in relative terms. 
 
We have to impute missing rental values using national rent-index data from Hillier 
Parker (today CBRE). The Hillier Parker ICHP national rent-index data is available 
back to 1965 but only for three years. This does allow us to impute missing rental 
values between 1965 and 1972 but for missing years, we assume a linear trend.  
 
Finally, we impute total occupation cost by assuming a constant scaling factor to fully 
adjusted prime rents using the ratio: average of the total occupation cost for each 
market in 2004 and 2005 divided by fully adjusted prime rent. We can match prime 
rent and total occupation costs for 8 of the 14 markets. For the remaining 6 markets 
we assume the ratio of the geographically closest market for which data are available. 
 
Our goal is to estimate, as accurately as possible, the magnitude of the RT over time 
for the 14 local office markets. The RT can be expressed as: 
 
jt jt jtRT = V  - MCC  (1) 
 
where Vjt is the market value of an additional square metre of office space in market j 
at time period t and where MCCjt is the corresponding marginal construction cost of 
adding one square metre of an additional floor. 
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The market value of a square metre of additional office space is estimated using the 
‘Equivalent Yield Model’, which is probably the most commonly used model to value 
income producing property in Britain.8 According to the equivalent yield model, the 
property value can be expressed as: 
 
( )1jt jt jt jtjt jt jtjt n
I R I
V
y y y
−= +
+
 (2) 
 
where jtV  is the value of the property (in location j at time period t), jty  is the 
corresponding equivalent yield, jtR  is the so called ‘current rental value’, jtI  is the 
‘passing income’ and jtn  is the number of years to the next rent review.  
 
The equivalent yield is equal to the internal rate of return (IRR) of two cash flow 
streams (a stream of ‘passing incomes’ up to the rent review and then a stream of 
current rental values, assumed to be constant (in real terms) in perpetuity). The 
‘passing income’ (which is expressed in nominal terms) only includes the rents that 
the tenants ‘pass’ on to their landlord. Tenants that are still in their rent-free period or 
non-rented space do not contribute to the passing income. Hence, in order to get from 
the (headline) prime rent to the passing income, adjustments for rent-free periods and 
vacancies have to be made as follows: 
 
1 1jt jtjt jt
Rent Free Period Vacancy Rate in %
I Prime Rent
Typical Contract Length 100
⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞= × − × −⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠
. (3) 
 
The ‘current rental value’ is measured in real terms and is assumed to remain constant 
in perpetuity. The capitalised value of the current rental value reflects the reversion 
value at the time when the current lease expires. 
 
If we make the reasonable assumption that the current rental value (in real terms) 
equals the passing income, then the property value can be expressed as 
 
jt
jt
jt
I
V
y
= . (4) 
 
Using equation (3), the estimated value can finally be expressed as: 
 
Rent Free Period Vacancy Rate in %
Prime Rent 1 1
Typical Contract Length 100
jt jt
jt
jt
jt
V
y
⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞× − × −⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠= . (4.1) 
 
The main advantage of using the equivalent yield model to estimate the capitalised 
value of office space is that it requires estimates of only two unknown variables: 
namely, an estimate of the passing income and the equivalent yield. The equivalent 
yield can be estimated from comparable properties in the local market place that have 
                                                 
8 See, for example, Brown and Matysiak (2000) for a more detailed discussion of the ‘Equivalent Yield 
Model’. 
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recently been sold (i.e., it can be derived through ‘reverse engineering’ using 
transaction prices and rental income information).  
 
Although the equivalent yield model is simplistic and obviously has a number of 
serious economic shortcomings, it provides surprisingly accurate valuations. This is 
probably for some combination of two reasons: First, professional valuers9 are 
familiar with subtle changes in the market that will influence the choice of yield; and 
second, valuers’ valuations – based on the equivalent yield model – are the basis for 
transactions (‘deals’). Hence, even if a valuation does not reflect the ‘true value’ of a 
property (reflecting all future cash flows discounted at the ‘correct’ rate), as long as 
buyers and sellers use the same valuation model, they will end up agreeing on a 
(transaction) price that reflects the model’s predicted value. 
 
The RT is computed as the estimated market value per square metre (fully adjusted 
for rent-free periods and vacancy rates) minus the marginal construction costs 
estimated from Davis Langdon’s data. Rather than reporting the regulatory tax 
directly, we report a quasi-tax rate, that is the regulatory tax relative to marginal 
construction cost: 
 
1jt jt jt jtjt
jt jt jt
RT V MCC V
RT Rate
MCC MCC MCC
−= = = − . (5) 
 
These regulatory tax rates are reported for all 14 markets and for all time periods with 
available data (see Figures F1-F4). 
 
The above outlines the way in which we estimated the ‘central’ value of the RT. 
Given that the RT is not directly observed but must be estimated making various 
assumptions, it is sensible to carry out a robustness check of results altering the 
underlying assumptions: specifically, we estimated regulatory tax values for three 
different sets of assumptions. The alternative sets of assumptions are as follows: 
 
1. Upper Bound: Assume that 50% of the difference between total occupation cost 
and prime rent is due to a regulatory tax and assume a 10% rent-premium for top 
floor space. 
2. Use the fully adjusted prime rent as the basis (as in the central estimate) but 
assume a 10% premium for top floors. 
3. Lower Bound: Use the fully adjusted prime rent as the basis (as in the central 
estimate) but assume a 0.5 percentage point higher yield than reported by CBRE. 
 
4 Results and their Interpretation 
 
The results are summarised in Tables 1 to 3. Table 1 shows the markets investigated. 
Table 2 illustrates the sensitivity of the results to alternative assumptions (as outlined 
above); and Table 3 reports the mean value of the ‘regulatory tax’ and other 
descriptive statistics for each year from 1961 to 2005.  The markets were selected to 
cover as wide and representative a range as possible including the main office 
locations in Scotland. 
 
                                                 
9 'Appraisers' in the US. 
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It is clear from Table 2 that there are no realistic assumptions which eliminate a 
substantial regulatory tax. The mean value, at 2.37, even for the most conservative 
lower bound estimate, is more than twice the highest value estimated for Manhattan 
housing by Glaeser et al (2005). 
 
Table 3 shows the annual mean values. We should largely discount values before 
1973 since these are i) weighted to the two London markets; and ii) we are uncertain 
as to the reliability of the estimated yields prior to 1972. 
 
It is immediately clear that the value of the regulatory tax moves with the real estate 
cycle. This is because real estate prices are substantially more volatile than are 
construction costs although, of course, one effect of regulatory restrictions would be 
to constrain supply and so reduce its elasticity in the upswing and increase the 
volatility of the cycle. Indeed, the high point of 4.01 for the mean value, reached in 
the boom of 1973, has not been exceeded since although this is partly a weighting 
issue: in 1973 the London markets had a greater weight in the mean. Nevertheless, the 
basic message is clear: the value of the estimated regulatory tax on office space 
averaged across all British office markets is an order of magnitude higher than the 
peak observed in the most highly regulated sector of the most regulated market in the 
US. 
 
It is more revealing, however, to look at the time series data for the individual markets 
reported in the Appendix Figures F1 to F4 – this discussion is in terms of the central 
estimate. The most revealing point of all is the contrast between the City and West 
End of London and the role of Canary Wharf and the development of the Docklands. 
Until the early 1980s, the City office market dominated supply and the City was the 
dominant location, with a quasi-monopolistic control. It had a highly restrictive 
planning policy both in terms of height restrictions (which still endure) and historic 
designation. Even as late as 1981, 22 conservation areas, affecting 28 percent of its 
land area were designated (Fainstein, 1994). The British property industry was 
significantly protected from international competition and supply was constrained. 
The response to the expansion in demand for office space from the 1960s was a rapid 
rise in prices reflecting the supply restrictions. The estimated value of the regulatory 
tax reached a high point in 1973, only just below a value of 18 (a ‘tax rate’ of 1800 
percent). This fell back to just more than 5 in the downturn of the mid-1970s.  
 
Another difference between the City and all other office locations except London’s 
Docklands – a special case controlled by the Docklands Development Corporation set 
up in 1981 to regenerate the rundown area of London’s near East End, adjacent to the 
City, but abandoned by port activity from the 1960s – is that of the political economy 
of the control on planning. In all locations other than the City (and Docklands), 
voting, and so political control, rests with the resident adult population. As has been 
cogently argued by Fischel (2001), depending on rates of owner occupation which are 
high in the UK, this produces a pressure to restrict development to protect house 
owners’ asset values. This is likely to be re-enforced by the asymmetry of the 
incidence of costs and benefits of physical development with the costs - both short 
term and in terms of asset value losses - being very localised while benefits are thinly 
and widely spread. In the City of London, however, political control of the planning 
system rests with the City Corporation which is controlled by the local business 
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community and its interests10. While these include property owners and real estate 
investors, the business community is dominated by other groups who have a mutual 
interest in retaining the City as a successful and competitive location for their 
businesses.  
 
As is explained by Fainstein (1994) the threat of the deregulation of financial services, 
actually introduced in 1986, concentrated the City fathers’ minds wonderfully.  
 
“….once the economic benefits of restricting growth ended, attitudes towards 
physical change easily became more flexible….Financial firms that already 
possessed space adjacent to the Bank of England benefited from their monopoly 
position and had no motivation to favour expansionary policies. Financial 
deregulation and competition changed the stakes. Competitive office development 
in the nearby Docklands threatened the interests of… the City. If the City refused 
to accommodate expansion when deregulation was prompting accelerated 
financial sector activity, firms already located there risked losing their locational 
advantage as the center of gravity moved eastwards….Once the decision to 
reverse the previous conservationist attitudes had been made, the City’s officers 
embarked on an active promotional effort. The planning director solicited advice 
from firms concerning their space needs and encouraged developers…to 
accommodate them…until the 1980s the City did not have a planning officer but 
only an architect who concerned himself with design approvals…new developable 
land was designated…and floor area ratios were modified to…permit an average 
of 25 percent expansion in the size of buildings.” Fainstein (1994, page 40) 
 
The planning system in the City is likely, therefore, to be responsive to the interests of 
commercial tenants and threats to local competitiveness. Such threats were visible by 
the early 1980s. By the time of the property market recovery of the second half of the 
1980s, and despite the growth of the financial services sector, the City was already 
under threat from both Docklands and other financial centres (including satellite 
centres such as Reading in which more office space was constructed during the early 
1980s than in the City itself) and its planning policies were becoming notably more 
relaxed. Its Unitary Plan, lodged in 1991 (City of London, 1991), but drawn up in the 
second half of the 1980s, identified as its first policy  “To encourage office 
development in order to maintain and expand the role of the city as a leading 
international financial and business centre” (para. 3.19). By the end of the 1980s, 
there were already large scale modern developments in the City, built to the highest 
international standards. Broadgate, for example, opened in 1991, provided 3 900 000 
square feet (360 000 m2) of new office space. 
 
Moreover, there was a radical change to the taxation of business property introduced 
in April 1990. Before then business property taxes (the business rates) had been set by 
local governments and - subject to standard procedures for ‘rate equalisation’ across 
the country - the revenues had accrued to local communities. There was concern in the 
then conservative government that anti-business, left wing local councils were 
boosting revenues and attempting to run re-distributive local policies funded by 
setting ever higher local business rates. This, it was thought, would hinder the long 
term competitiveness of British business. So in 1990 the UBR was introduced with 
                                                 
10 This goes back to the ancient privileges of the medieval city and the leverage its tax revenues gave it 
in negotiating a high degree of independence and local control from the crown. 
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national rate-setting and with revenues accruing to central government. There was one 
exception, however, the City Corporation (self-evidently not anti-business!) was 
allowed to add its own ‘precept’ to collect its own revenues. Thus from 1990 there has 
been a strong negative fiscal incentive for any local government in Britain, except the 
City of London, to permit any commercial development. 
 
While the value of the regulatory tax in the City rose during the later 1980s as 
property values rose rapidly in the boom, it never reached the high of 1973. Indeed, in 
contrast to the rest of Britain, the regulatory tax estimate for the City has been on a 
downward trend since 1973. We can see from the evidence that is available for the 
Docklands that the regulatory regime was far less restrictive there, with an estimate of 
the regulatory tax never exceeding 4 – though that still represents a quasi-tax rate of 
400 percent. The West End, where there is political control by residents and a 
negative fiscal incentive for development, is a market which specialises in sectors 
other than financial services. It has much stronger planning protection for 
conservation reasons, with height restrictions which are impossible to breech (unlike 
in the City where, outside the conservation areas, employing a ‘trophy architect’ has 
been an emerging mechanism for building higher). As a consequence, the West End 
has, in contrast to the City, experienced a steady increase in estimated RT with its 
high value of 1973 exceeded in 2000 and with an estimated value of 7.9 over the past 
six years – almost twice that in the City. 
 
The pattern outside the London locations is much as would be expected. The 
estimated RT was much lower until quite recently and in Newcastle in the 1980s was 
negative for a short time. In a representative, prosperous, satellite centre such as 
Reading (discussed in more detail in Section 7), which was a major recipient of the 
back office move from London from the late 1960s, the value of the regulatory tax 
was high during the late 1970s and early 1980s but fell back somewhat as the market 
expanded. By 2000, the local market was quite specialised in hi-tech companies and 
the value of the regulatory tax fell below 2 as the dot.com boom collapsed. It has been 
creeping up since 2002/2003. The absolute value varies in provincial centres, with 
Edinburgh, Birmingham and Leeds seemingly the most restrictive. But it has been 
tending to rise in all centres since the mid 1990s and has only been consistently below 
a value of 2 in Newcastle, in the relatively depressed North East. 
 
All these numbers relate to our ‘central’ estimate but, of course, values of measures 
on alternative assumptions follow similar trends – just absolute values differ. Perhaps 
the salient fact is that even on the most conservative of all assumptions there is a 
significant positive estimated value for the regulatory tax in all locations for recent 
years. The lowest – Newcastle – has a value of more than 1.6 and most major 
provincial centres are around 2; London’s West End has had an estimated value of 
between 4 and 9 since the early 1970s and has a current value of 8. These are 
estimated on the most conservative assumptions, so are lower bounds, and compare 
with a value not significantly different from zero for offices in Manhattan (Glaeser et 
al 2005).  Moreover, there may be a degree of endogeneity between construction costs 
and planning restrictiveness. In areas like the City or the West End developers may 
need an expensive design and a ‘trophy architect’ to get planning permission for 
buildings offering more rentable space per unit area of the site. In Newcastle, the local 
community may be so pleased that any developer wants to build that it is 
correspondingly easier to get permission and de facto the planning regime imposes a 
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lower regulatory tax. This possible endogeneity will mean that our central estimate 
systematically tends to understate the value of the regulatory tax rather than overstate 
it, however, and this should be borne in mind in interpreting the alternative estimates 
and selecting the most plausible. 
 
5 International Comparison of Regulatory Tax Values  
 
In order to put the results for the British office markets into an international context, 
we also estimated RT values for a number of cities across Europe; Amsterdam, 
Barcelona, Brussels, Frankfurt, London City, London West End, Milan, Paris City, 
Paris La Défense and Stockholm. We use essentially the same methodology as 
described above but different data sources (JLL instead of CBRE and Gardiner and 
Theobald instead of Davis Langdon) and have to make a number of additional 
adjustments – described in Appendix E – to compute comparable RT values. 
 
We also report RT values for the two British office markets for which both Davis 
Langdon and Gardiner and Theobald construction cost data are available– the City of 
London and London West End. This provides a cross-check on the comparability of 
our RT estimates for British and continental European office markets. There is a 
relatively small difference in estimated RT values (average of 1999 and 2005) for the 
two markets; 4.5 versus 4.9 for the City and 8.0 versus 9.0 for the West End. Overall, 
the relatively small differences suggest that our estimates for the continental European 
markets are quite comparable to those for the British office markets. 
 
When we compare our RT estimates for the various European office markets the first 
result that catches one’s eye is the fact that the two London Markets top the ‘league 
table’ with the West End’s RT estimate of 8.0 (the average of the RT estimates for 
1999 and 2005) being more than twice that of any continental European city except 
Frankfurt with 4.4. Stockholm and Milan also appear to have comparatively high RT 
values with 3.8 and 3.1. This is consistent with anecdotal evidence for these markets. 
For example, Milan is a very tightly regulated city with strict height restrictions in 
place. Not surprisingly, suburban locations have started to develop outside Milan; first 
Milano 2 and Milano 3 in the late 1960s and 1970s and now Milano Santa Giulia. The 
latter is being built in a politically independent commune in the southeast part of the 
urban region of Milan, between Rogoredo and Linate which has been derelict for 
some years. The area where it is being developed was the location of the now 
abandoned Montedison factories and Redaelli steel mills. Local politicians there – not 
surprisingly – are happy to welcome new development projects.  
 
As in London, estimated RT values in Paris differ quite substantially within the metro 
area; they are much higher in the ‘historic’ City of Paris, where conservation 
regulations are tight, than they are in La Défense, a purpose planned new office and 
commercial centre on the edge of the historic centre. . Finally, the city that we had 
expected to have the lowest RT is indeed at the bottom of the ‘league table’. Belgium 
is well known to have a flexible land use regulation system which imposes little 
constraint on supply. In Brussels – despite the rapid increase in demand for office 
space as a result of the increasing size and influence of the EU institutions - we 
estimate a low RT of 0.7, although this value is still much higher than that estimated 
by Glaeser et al (2005) for the office market of Manhattan.  
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Overall, the RT comparison for the 10 European office markets suggests (a) that the 
British office market is by orders of magnitude more supply constrained by regulation 
than other office markets in Europe and (b) that European cities generally seem to be 
subjected to tighter regulatory restrictions on supply and consequently higher RT 
values than those found in the United States. Below, we turn again to the British 
office market in an attempt to explain the determinants of its restrictiveness. 
 
6 The Political Economy of Planning Restrictiveness 
 
If the estimated value of the RT really represents a measure of the costs of regulatory 
restrictiveness – we should be able to model its determinants. As noted above, in areas 
where there is control of planning policy by local residents – overwhelmingly owner 
occupiers – we should expect a strong resistance to development. Not only are there 
short run costs to local residents from large scale construction but there are likely to 
be environmental costs and losses of amenity values. Benefits – in the form of more 
jobs or higher wages – are likely to accrue as much to non-residents as to residents 
given the small size of local government areas in the UK. In addition – re-enforced 
since the introduction of the UBR in 1990 – there will be a powerful fiscal 
disincentive; even before 1990, the impact on local budgets of business property 
development was probably unfavourable because of the high proportion of local 
revenues coming from central government and rate revenue equalisation across local 
communities. The only incentive for local residents to allow the development of 
additional commercial real estate would presumably be falling local economic 
prosperity. This is likely to be most plausibly formulated as fear of job loss and 
unemployment. 
 
We should expect the City of London and Docklands to behave rather differently, 
however, since in these jurisdictions business interests control planning policy.  In the 
case of the City, the planning authority is its unique local governing body, the 
Corporation of the City of London. This is an historic entity and it has been exempt 
from all the major reforms of local government in the modern era, in particular from 
both the Municipal Corporations Act of 1835 and the legislation in 1969 which 
abolished the ‘business’ vote. The City is, in effect, a Central Business District with a 
few thousand residents, so the business electorate (including land owners and property 
companies but dominated by financial and other businesses located in the City) 
controls the Corporation which is the planning authority for the area. Business voting 
power is weighted by the number of employees. The London Docklands Development 
Corporation (LDDC) was established in 1981. This was a directly appointed body, not 
an elected and representative one, with the specific brief to regenerate the large – a 
total of 8.5 square miles - derelict port area immediately to the east of the City of 
London. The LDDC was responsible for all the major planning for the area until it 
was abolished in 1998 when planning responsibilities reverted to the local Boroughs 
of London. However, by then, the whole area had been transformed with the most 
notable development being Canary Wharf. In total 25 million square feet of office and 
industrial floor space had been developed.  
 
Given, therefore, their different controlling interests we should expect these two 
planning authorities to be less restrictive of development, other things equal11, and 
                                                 
11 But of course, other things are not equal since the restrictions (in terms of plot ratios, for example) 
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much more responsive to local economic conditions than resident-controlled planning 
authorities. For any given (change in the) level of local prosperity, the business 
controlled LAs would be expected to relax their constraints on development 
substantially more than would the resident controlled communities. We might, 
furthermore, expect to observe a change in regulatory restrictiveness as a result of the 
introduction of the UBR in early 1990, with all other British office locations 
becoming more restrictive relative to the City of London which, alone, retained the 
capacity to raise revenues locally from business property. 
 
The best measure of ‘local economic prosperity’ would seem to be the unemployment 
rate of residents. Not only is this the most immediately observable and widely 
reported measure but the fear of job insecurity seems likely to be a concern for voters, 
and thus an influence on local politicians. It has the additional advantage that it is 
measurable if with considerably more difficulty than might be imagined12. Because of 
the difficulties of estimating consistent long term time series for local area 
unemployment rates for our office location, we experimented with four alternative 
techniques. These are described in Appendix G. Table 5 provides summary statistics 
of our preferred unemployment rate measure used in the empirical analysis below. 
The very reassuring outcome, however, was that the basic analytical results were 
essentially unaffected by the particular series for local unemployment used. 
 
Table 6 shows the results from our first specification, pooling all 480 observations 
and including both year and location fixed effects. We estimate the following: 
 
0 1jt jt jtRT Uβ β ε= + × +   (6) 
 ( ) ( )0 1 2jt jt B jt R jtRT U D U Dβ β β ε= + × × + × × +  (7) 
 
Where: 
 
RT  =  estimated value of Regulatory Tax 
U  =  estimated British Labour Force Survey-equivalent unemployment rate 
D  =  dummies for B, business controlled, and R, resident controlled local 
 government 
j,t   refer to the location and year 
                                                                                                                                            
are more or less constant across locations but demand for space is not, so a given restriction is more 
binding where demand is greater. This is reflected in the larger location fixed effects observed in the 
City (Table 6) than in other locations. 
12 There are two basic sources of data on unemployment in the UK: survey based data, conforming to 
ILO norms, available from 1973; and ‘registration’ data available since the early 20th Century. The 
problem is that prior to 1999 the sample for the survey based data was too small to give reliable results 
for local planning authority jurisdictions; and the registration measure is highly sensitive to both the 
incentives to register and rules governing who is actually counted. As unemployment rose from the late 
1970s politicians could not resist manipulating the unemployment figures (registration data is released 
very quickly and is what the media focus on) by frequently changing both the incentive to register and 
the rules governing who was counted. Each of the changes had the effect of reducing measured 
‘registered’ unemployment. To estimate unemployment rates for our local government units 
(representing the Local Planning Authorities) we calculated the ratio of regional survey to registration 
unemployment rate for each time period and used that to adjust the registration rate for the local area 
most closely corresponding to the LPA to a quasi-survey based value. To save space we report only one 
set of results here, for what seem to us to be the most defensible technique. Results for the other sets of 
estimations are available from the authors. 
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In Table 6, we show results for two separate versions of the specification stated in 
equations (7) and (8); in columns 1 and 2 we use values of the local unemployment 
rate for the actual nearest equivalent planning authority areas for which data could be 
estimated for the locations outside London but unemployment for the Greater London 
area as a whole for all five office locations within London. In columns 3 and 4 we use 
the estimated unemployment rate for the whole Greater London area for just the three 
office locations in central London, the City, Westminster and Docklands but the local 
unemployment rate for the relevant Boroughs, Hammersmith and Croydon, for the 
two more residential, suburban office locations, Boroughs in London, being the local 
planning authorities. The logic for this is that the workforces and businesses based in 
London’s three central locations operate over a wide area and draw their labour forces 
from the wider London region; moreover, particularly in the City, there are very few 
residents relative to employees. As can be seen the results are essentially identical and 
in subsequent tables we report only those using unemployment rates for Greater 
London as a whole for the three central London office locations.  
 
The results in Table 6 show a significant negative relationship between local 
unemployment and our measure of planning restrictiveness – the Regulatory Tax. 
Moreover, as expected, the estimated value of the parameter is much larger in the 
business controlled compared to the resident controlled locations: the estimated value 
of the coefficient is almost three times as great in absolute terms in the business 
controlled locations (in both specifications reported in columns 2 and 4 of Table 6) 
and an F-test shows that these values are significantly different in statistical terms. 
Most location and year fixed effects are statistically significant. A White-test cannot 
reject the null-hypothesis of homoskedasticity, hence we report normal standard 
errors. 
 
There are two obvious problems with these results. The first problem is that estimated 
values of RT become possible at different dates for different locations, with estimates 
for the first few years only being available for the City and the West End. That is, our 
sample is unbalanced.13 Thus, the composition of the sample and the implicit weight 
of different locations within it change over time. To address this problem we restrict 
the data in all subsequent specifications, reported in Tables 7 to 10, to the 11 locations 
for which there is annual data on a continuous basis since 1973 (see Table 1 for a list 
of these 11 locations and Table 5 for summary statistics of the unemployment rates 
for the balanced sample). 
 
The second problem is that although we are interpreting local unemployment as a 
‘supply side’ variable, operating on the restrictiveness of planning constraints via the 
local political process, it could also be interpreted as a ‘demand side’ measure. As can 
be seen from Figures F1 to F4 in Appendix F the estimates of the RT are cyclical: the 
price of office space is more cyclically sensitive than are the marginal costs of 
construction. We would argue that the real evidence in support of our hypothesis that 
the intensity of constraints imposed is politically determined and relaxes only under 
the pressure of unemployment, is not so much that the coefficients across all office 
locations (columns 1 and 3 in Table 6) are highly significant but that there is much 
                                                 
13 The RT measures prior to 1973 are also based on imputed values for yields, which are measured with 
some degree of uncertainty. See Appendix D for details. 
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greater sensitivity to unemployment in business controlled compared to resident 
controlled locations (columns 2 and 4 in Table 6). Nevertheless, there is an 
identification issue. We address this issue by including as direct a measure of demand 
for office space as we can find, as an additional explanatory variable in our 
subsequent analysis below (Tables 7 to 10).  
 
The most obvious variable measuring demand for office space is employment growth 
in office employing sectors14. Since we were aiming to measure a demand side 
variable we constructed our office employment series for Local Authority areas and 
for each of the five London locations individually rather than using office 
employment for Greater London as a whole for any of them. There have been three 
significant changes in industrial classification since 1971 affecting local area 
employment statistics. To minimise the impact of this we constructed two alternative 
series: one for a broad definition – all service employment. The second is a narrower 
definition attempting to exclude sectors such as distribution which are not primarily 
office employment sectors but once more subject to classification changes. The 
second measure covers financial services, banking, public administration and ‘other’ 
services. Fortunately there is a bridge year available for each change in classification 
so in constructing the office employment index for each location we used this overlap 
to scale one series to the next. The details of how office employment was estimated 
are given in Appendix G. Summary statistics for the two measures are provided in 
Table 5. 
 
Tables 7 to 10 report the results but now fitted only for a balanced sample of 363 
observations. The models are as before but now include a control variable for local 
office employment growth: 
 
εβββ jtjtjtjt SURT +×+×+= 210  (8) 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) εβββββ jtRjtBjtRjtBjtjt DSDSDUDURT +××+××+××+××+= 43210  (9) 
 
where other variables are as before and S equals the local office employment growth 
rate. Table 7 shows the result without year fixed effects and, then, in Table 8, 
including both location and year fixed effects. As might be expected the results for the 
balanced sample are significantly stronger and those with year fixed effects are 
stronger still. In each table, results are shown for directly comparable models i) 
excluding and ii) including the office sector employment growth rate as an additional 
independent variable. The particular results shown here relate to the narrow definition 
of office employment but those for the broad definition are in all cases virtually the 
same.15 Including service employment, whether interacted with business/resident 
control or not, makes no significant difference to the results with respect to the 
unemployment variable. The parameter estimates are all but identical – certainly not 
different in a statistical sense – and there is a numerically substantial and statistically 
significant difference (at the 1 percent level) in the size of the estimated parameters 
between business and resident controlled locations in all cases. The results for the 
office employment growth rate are mainly not significant and, where they are, 
                                                 
14 Strictly, employment is only an appropriate demand measure if there is a fixed floor space to 
employee ratio. In reality – certainly in the longer run – there can be substitution – but nevertheless 
employment in office sectors seems as pure a demand side measure as is available.  
15 Results are available from the authors upon request. 
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significant only at the 10 percent level either when the office employment growth rate 
variable is not interacted with the dummy for local control or – where it is – only for 
resident controlled locations. 
 
Tables 9 and 10 now show the results of testing for the introduction of the UBR in a 
comparable set of models. As explained above, this change could be expected to have 
significantly increased the fiscal disincentive to permit development for all local 
communities relative to the City of London. The new basis for business property 
taxation came into force in April 1990, although it may have been partly anticipated. 
We chose the end of 1989 as the break point.16 There are two obvious ways to test 
whether this made local communities become relatively more restrictive than the City. 
We can include a dummy for all markets except the City from the end of 1989. The 
results are reported in Table 9 for a comparable set of models as discussed in the 
previous paragraph. Again, as can be seen from comparing the results reported in 
columns 1 and 2 (where the office sector employment growth rate is not included) 
with those in columns 3, 4 and 5 (in which the office sector employment growth rate 
is included) including the office employment growth rate, makes no significant 
difference to the results for the unemployment variable. Results shown in columns 1 
and 3 do not allow for the impact of unemployment on the value of the RT to vary 
between business and resident controlled locations; those shown in columns 2, 4 and 5 
adjust for the type of local control. Compared to previous models we now include an 
additional dummy for all locations after 1989, implicitly assuming the effect of the 
change in the fiscal incentive was uniform. The model continues to perform well but 
we now observe a significant across the board increase in estimated planning 
restrictiveness in all locations compared to the City of London from 1989, the year of 
the introduction of the UBR. 
 
The results reported in Table 10, for the same set of models, permit the local response 
to the change in property taxes to vary across all locations. We see that the City 
appeared to become significantly less restrictive – as expected – while 6 out of 10 of 
the other locations became significantly more restrictive. These conclusions are not 
affected if the office sector employment growth rate is included as a control. For all 
locations where the sign was negative, it was insignificant, except in Reading. In 
Reading, however, we observe an apparently anomalous reduction in restrictiveness, 
significant at the 5 percent level. Reading is an unusual jurisdiction. It is about 60 kms 
to the west of London and a high speed train service opened up in 1976, with services 
taking only 22 minutes to the London terminus. This triggered its development as a 
satellite back office location, producing a large demand shock relative to its then stock 
of office space. Prices and our estimate of the RT rose quickly in the second half of 
the 1970s. This expansion was initially supported by the local government. But during 
the 1980s the Trotskyite left, which strongly opposed office development, took 
political control. However, the recession of 1989-91 hit the local economy very hard 
and moderates regained control. Moreover in reaction to the perceived anti-business 
thrust of local government, the wider region within which Reading then lay – 
Berkshire in particular – teamed up with local business interests and the University to 
set up the Thames Valley Economic Partnership (TVEP) in 1991. The explicit intent 
of this was to make the local area more business friendly and to encourage business 
                                                 
16 However, results do not change significantly if we choose one year earlier or one year later as break 
point. 
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expansion. Perhaps it is the change in political control from radical left to moderate, 
and the lobbying activities of TVEP, which had some impact in reducing Reading’s 
planning restrictiveness from 1990. The individual location specific post-1989 
dummy coefficient is estimating the change in the RT from that date compared to 
before that date. In most jurisdictions, there could have been factors in the post-1989 
period, in addition to the introduction of the UBR, that might have had an influence 
on planning restrictiveness and so on our estimates of RT. But in Reading, it is 
plausible to believe these were particularly important which both increased the 
measure of the RT in the pre-1989 period and may have reduced it in the post-1989 
period. 
 
Overall, however, these results seem to provide strong support for the interpretations 
offered and reinforce our confidence in the RT as a reasonable measure of the impact 
of planning restrictiveness on the costs of office space. Although demand and supply 
may not be fully identified, the most obvious direct measure of demand – office 
employment growth – is hardly significant and, when included in the models, has no 
impact on the estimated effect of the unemployment variable, designed to measure 
local political pressures for the relaxation of planning restrictiveness. The strongest 
evidence for the hypotheses, however, is probably provided by the difference in the 
estimated impact of the unemployment variable depending on the form of local 
political control of the planning system. The estimates show that business controlled 
planning authorities react significantly more strongly to local unemployment than do 
resident controlled authorities and that fiscal (dis)incentives for local communities 
have the expected impact on permitting development.  
 
7 Conclusions 
 
The Regulatory Tax measure of the gross costs of land use regulations for occupiers 
of property seems to be a useful one. Although it will not reflect certain forms of 
regulatory constraint, such as heavy compliance costs or costs associated with delays 
and is, therefore, a lower bound measure, the ease with which it can be estimated is a 
very substantial advantage. In this paper, we provide the first estimates for 
commercial property and show that for office buildings in British cities it is 
substantially larger than it is in comparable continental European cities. Despite using 
different data sources for the international comparison, which includes the City of 
London and London West End, we get values for the two London markets that are 
very comparable. The conclusion is that supply in the British office market, like the 
British residential sector, is highly constrained by regulation and this costs business 
occupiers a substantial amount. It is, in effect, a tax on office users. Unless space is 
perfectly substitutable in production, therefore, there will be further costs in terms of 
output and employment. 
 
We argue that such a level of regulatory restriction – an order of magnitude greater 
than the peak observed in the most restricted sector, in the most restricted markets in 
the US – is to be expected given the aims of British planning policy, the form of its 
instruments, the fragmented geographical scale of decision making (which internalises 
costs associated with development but not benefits), and the fiscal disincentive to 
local communities to allow commercial development. In this context we would expect 
differences in regulatory constraints between those authorities controlled by business 
interests compared to those controlled by residents. We are fortunate that the 
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historical anomaly of the City of London – controlled by business interests since the 
middle ages and exempt from all the major reforms of local government of the 
modern age, allows us to test this proposition. We find strong evidence that business 
control makes a significant difference to the tightness of regulatory constraints on 
office building and on the reaction of restrictiveness to local economic prosperity 
measured by the unemployment rate. Including a direct measure of demand for office 
space makes no difference to the result, reinforcing our conclusion that we are 
observing variation in regulatory constraints – the supply side. 
 
It is also possible to test the hypothesis that regulatory restriction responds to fiscal 
incentives and that, in particular, changes in the incentives to allow commercial 
development resulting from the introduction of the UBR early in 1990, led to even 
more restrictive land use regulation. This, again, is because the City of London was in 
large measure protected from the change and continued to be able to levy its own rate 
on business property. Again, we find strong evidence that the elimination of any fiscal 
incentive to permit commercial development was associated with an increase in the 
value of the RT outside the City of London. By further restricting the supply of office 
space, costs were increased.  
 
Together these findings support our confidence that the RT measure is really 
capturing – or at least closely correlated with – the gross costs imposed by land use 
regulation. 
 
One of the interesting speculations this prompts is about unintended consequences.  
As discussed above, the 1980s Conservative government perceived left wing local 
authorities as engaged in a concerted effort to frustrate its efforts to increase 
incentives, privatise state industries, sell off social housing and reduce the total tax 
take. To finance these efforts to offset the adverse and regressive impact central 
government actions were perceived as having, local government was (perceived to be) 
increasing their tax revenues from the business rate, perhaps as part of a punitive anti-
business crusade. Central government’s response was to introduce the UBR. This 
removed control of business property taxes from local communities, effectively 
turning business property taxes into a national tax. It managed, therefore, not only to 
eliminate all tax revenue gains to local communities from commercial real estate 
development but to make this fact perfectly transparent. Nevertheless, local 
governments continued to have a legal obligation to provide services to local 
businesses. So it produced a powerful and transparent fiscal disincentive for local 
communities to permit any commercial development.  
 
Over time, our results suggest, this has restricted the supply of offices and pushed up 
the value of the Regulatory Tax. The increase in business costs this represents may 
more than offset any costs that might realistically have been imposed by old-style left 
wing councils attempting to raise money from local property taxes; especially given 
the demise of old-style left wing councils that occurred between 1989 and the present.  
 
Indeed, we can quantify this effect because of the fortunate fact that the City of 
London alone was given a partial exemption from the UBR. Table 11 shows some 
indicative numbers. We choose an office of 1,500 m2 – just about enough to 
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accommodate a medium size firm with 200 employees.17 In the London Borough of 
Camden in 2005, such a building had a rateable value of £112,25018 so, with the rate 
multiple set at 42.6p, that meant the occupants would be paying a UBR of £47, 819 a 
year. If the RT increased in Camden to the average extent it did across the rest of the 
country, then the implied increase in its annualised cost was £67,312. Moving to a 
UBR, to avoid local communities levying extortionate taxes on business, seems likely 
to have resulted indirectly in a larger financial burden by way of the RT, than the total 
cost of business rates themselves. 
 
 
                                                 
17 Based on the London Employment Sites Database (Roger Tym & Partners, 2005) the space usage in 
Inner London is 19 m2 per office job, suggesting a site of 3,800 m2 for a medium size firm with 200 
employees. Hence, our assumption of 1,500 m2 is a very conservative assumption, implying that we are 
underestimating rather than overestimating the regulation induced increase in annualised occupation 
cost. 
18 7/8 Greenland Place, London, NW1 0AP. 
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Tables 
 
TABLE 1 
Investigated UK Office Markets and Data Availability 
 
Office Market Years with 
Available Data 
14 Market 
Sample 
(Unbalanced) 
11 Market 
Sample 
(Balanced) 
City of London 1961-2005 Yes Yes 
London West End 1961-2005 Yes Yes 
London Docklands (Canary Wharf Tower) 1998-2005 Yes No 
Croydon (Outer Suburban London) 1965-2005 Yes Yes 
London Hammersmith (Inner Suburban London) 1991-2005 Yes No 
Maidenhead (South East) 1984-2005 Yes No 
Reading (South East) 1965-2005 Yes Yes 
Bristol (South West) 1973-2005 Yes Yes 
Birmingham (West Midlands) 1965-2005 Yes Yes 
Leeds (Yorkshire and Humberside) 1973-2005 Yes Yes 
Manchester (North West) 1973-2005 Yes Yes 
Newcastle (Upon Tyne) 1965-2005 Yes Yes 
Edinburgh (Scotland) 1965-2005 Yes Yes 
Glasgow (Scotland) 1965-2005 Yes Yes 
 
 
TABLE 2 
Summary Statistics: Regulatory Tax relative to Marginal Construction Cost 
 
Variable: Ratio: Regulatory Tax / MCC Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Specification:      
 Based on prime rent (no adjustment) 480 3.70 2.92 0.13 22.06 
 Prime rent partially adjusted for rent-free 
periods 480 3.03 2.66 -0.05 19.81 
 Prime rent fully adjusted for rent-free periods 
and vacancy rates (central estimate) 480 2.64 2.37 -0.14 17.55 
 Upper bound: Assume 10% premium for top 
floor plus 50% of fully adjusted total 
occupation cost markup 
480 3.88 3.10 0.15 23.95 
 Based on fully adjusted prime rent plus 10% 
premium for top floor 480 3.01 2.60 -0.05 19.41 
 Lower bound: As central estimate but assume 
0.5 percentage point higher yield 480 2.37 2.15 -0.18 15.78 
Data Sources: CBRE (prime rent, yield and total occupation cost information), Davis Langdon (marginal 
construction cost information), IPD (national void rate index) and ODPM (regional vacancy rates). 
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TABLE 3 
Summary Statistics: Relative Regulatory Tax over Time (1961-2005) 
 (Central Estimate) 
 
Year Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
1961 2 2.93 0.33 2.70 3.16 
1962 2 3.07 0.12 2.98 3.15 
1963 2 3.13 0.24 2.96 3.31 
1964 2 2.99 0.20 2.85 3.13 
1965 8 1.68 1.04 0.42 2.96 
1966 8 1.85 1.13 0.53 3.37 
1967 8 2.02 1.24 0.64 3.83 
1968 8 2.36 1.63 0.73 4.97 
1969 8 2.69 2.33 0.71 7.27 
1970 8 2.69 3.22 0.39 9.98 
1971 8 2.88 3.42 0.37 9.99 
1972 8 2.58 3.36 0.20 9.63 
1973 11 4.01 5.08 0.62 17.55 
1974 11 2.86 4.49 0.00 15.57 
1975 11 1.87 1.81 0.14 6.37 
1976 11 2.43 1.53 0.80 5.36 
1977 11 2.86 2.29 1.06 7.38 
1978 11 3.00 2.30 1.14 7.65 
1979 11 3.13 2.64 1.12 8.70 
1980 11 2.06 2.24 0.27 7.12 
1981 11 2.42 2.42 0.34 8.08 
1982 11 2.34 2.45 0.36 8.51 
1983 11 2.16 2.37 0.16 8.13 
1984 12 2.08 2.19 -0.07 7.85 
1985 12 2.18 2.32 -0.07 8.13 
1986 12 2.20 2.54 -0.11 8.90 
1987 12 2.61 3.79 -0.12 13.35 
1988 12 2.73 3.66 -0.14 11.79 
1989 12 3.10 3.36 0.20 11.36 
1990 12 2.95 2.88 0.42 9.27 
1991 13 2.61 1.97 0.60 7.61 
1992 13 2.24 1.32 0.54 5.46 
1993 13 1.91 1.03 0.46 4.60 
1994 13 2.63 1.35 0.78 6.02 
1995 13 2.96 1.65 0.99 7.13 
1996 13 3.24 1.91 1.12 7.99 
1997 13 3.30 2.14 1.10 8.46 
1998 14 3.23 2.15 1.02 8.58 
1999 14 3.21 2.16 1.06 9.18 
2000 14 3.45 2.41 1.10 10.22 
2001 14 3.09 2.17 0.86 8.73 
2002 14 2.56 1.64 0.81 6.90 
2003 14 2.07 1.26 0.63 5.69 
2004 14 2.17 1.53 0.67 7.05 
2005 14 2.63 1.91 0.99 8.89 
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TABLE 4 
Estimates of Regulatory Tax for Selected European Cities 
 
 Estimated Regulatory Tax 
City 1999 2005 Average 
London West End 7.62 8.37 8.00 
London City 4.68 4.31 4.49 
Frankfurt 5.44 3.31 4.37 
Stockholm 4.28 3.30 3.79 
Milan 2.07 4.11 3.09 
Paris: City 2.35 3.75 3.05 
Barcelona 2.23 3.16 2.69 
Amsterdam 2.12 1.92 2.02 
Paris: La Defense 1.41 1.93 1.67 
Brussels 0.52 0.84 0.68 
Notes: Estimates are based on data provided by Jones Lang LaSalle (JLL), capital value data, and
Gardiner and Theobald (construction cost data). The data from JLL are hypothetical capital values based
on mid-point yields and prime rent information. The provided values assume that buildings are
permanently renewed (so called Peter-Pan buildings). We adjusted the value by a scaling factor to
predict actual capital values. The scaling factor is derived by using prime rent, prime yield, vacancy rate 
and rent-free period information from CBRE. The computation method for the scaling factor is described
in more detail in Appendix E. The estimated scaling factor is 0.697. That is, actual capital value = 0.697
* capital value based on the assumption that the building is permanently renewed and ignoring rent-free 
periods and vacancy rates. The average construction cost estimates from Gardiner and Theobald are
adjusted by another scaling factor to get marginal construction costs. The scaling factor is derived by 
using marginal construction cost information from Davis Langdon. The estimated scaling factor is 0.827.
That is, the marginal construction cost of an additional hypothetical floor (excluding fixed cost) = 0.827
* average construction cost (including fixed cost). The computation method for the scaling factor is
described in more detail Appendix E. 
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TABLE 5 
Summary Statistics—Explanatory Variables 
 
 Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Unbalanced Sample      
Unemployment rate in local office market 
(measure 1)† 480 0.0800 0.0487 0.00685 0.273 
Unemployment rate (measure 1) † in markets 
with business controlled development 53 0.0619 0.0343 0.00871 0.132 
Unemployment rate (measure 1) † in markets 
with resident controlled development 427 0.0823 0.0498 0.00685 0.273 
Unemployment rate in local office market 
(measure 2)‡ 480 0.0795 0.0488 0.00685 0.273 
Unemployment rate (measure 2)‡ in markets with 
business controlled development 53 0.0619 0.0343 0.00871 0.132 
Unemployment rate (measure 2)‡ in markets with 
resident controlled development 427 0.0817 0.0499 0.00685 0.273 
      
Balanced Sample      
Unemployment rate in local office market 
(measure 2)‡ 363 0.0908 0.0479 0.0159 0.273 
Unemployment rate (measure 2)‡ in markets with 
business controlled development 33 0.0765 0.0297 0.0187 0.132 
Unemployment rate (measure 2)‡ in markets with 
resident controlled development 330 0.0922 0.0492 0.0159 0.273 
Service employment growth rate 363 0.0133 0.0449 -0.142 0.257 
Service employment growth rate in markets with 
business controlled development  33 0.00714 0.0585 -0.115 0.120 
Service employment growth rate in markets with 
resident controlled development 330 0.0139 0.0434 -0.142 0.257 
Notes: †The unemployment rate of the Greater London Area (GLA) is used for all five London markets. 
‡The unemployment rate of the GLA is used for the City of London, London West End and London 
Docklands (Canary Wharf).  Local unemployment rates are used for Croydon and Hammersmith. 
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TABLE 6 
Explaining the Regulatory Tax—Unbalanced Sample with Year Fixed Effects 
(Fixed Effects Model, 1961-2005, all Locations) 
 
 Dependent Variable: Regulatory Tax 
Explanatory Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
-11.166    Unemployment rate in local office 
market (measure 1)† (3.304)***    
  -10.936  Unemployment rate in local office 
market (measure 2)‡   (3.278)***  
 -28.369   Unemployment rate (measure 1) † * 
business controlled (bB1)  (6.053)***   
 -10.863   Unemployment rate (measure 1) † * 
resident controlled (bR1)  (3.265)***   
   -27.881 Unemployment rate (measure 2) ‡ * 
business controlled (bB2)    (6.017)*** 
   -10.531 Unemployment rate (measure 2) ‡ * 
resident controlled (bR2)    (3.241)*** 
6.176 7.288 6.187 7.294 City of London (0.303)*** (0.445)*** (0.303)*** (0.446)*** 
5.269 5.323 5.280 5.338 London West End (0.303)*** (0.300)*** (0.303)*** (0.299)*** 
2.067 3.281 2.072 3.279 London Docklands (Canary Wharf) (0.483)*** (0.598)*** (0.483)*** (0.599)*** 
0.095 0.110 0.008 0.031 Croydon (Outer Suburban London) (0.306) (0.302) (0.321) (0.318) 
1.088 1.052 1.192 1.156 London Hammersmith (Inner 
Suburban London) (0.382)*** (0.377)*** (0.374)*** (0.370)*** 
1.108 1.089 1.131 1.121 Maidenhead (South East) (0.426)*** (0.421)*** (0.424)*** (0.419)*** 
1.309 1.330 1.325 1.353 Reading (South East) (0.349)*** (0.345)*** (0.348)*** (0.344)*** 
0.139 0.130 0.153 0.150 Bristol (South West) (0.329) (0.325) (0.328) (0.325) 
0.979 0.986 0.984 0.993 Birmingham (West Midlands) (0.270)*** (0.267)*** (0.270)*** (0.267)*** 
0.293 0.287 0.310 0.310 Leeds (Yorkshire and Humberside) (0.345) (0.341) (0.343) (0.339) 
0.979 0.950 0.979 0.949 Manchester (North West) (0.281)*** (0.277)*** (0.281)*** (0.278)*** 
0.929 0.945 0.941 0.962 Edinburgh (Scotland) (0.311)*** (0.308)*** (0.311)*** (0.307)*** 
1.212 1.204 1.206 1.195 Glasgow (Scotland) (0.275)*** (0.271)*** (0.275)*** (0.271)*** 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
-2.668 -3.156 -2.681 -3.172 Constant (0.887)*** (0.888)*** (0.887)*** (0.889)*** 
Observations 480 480 480 480 
Number of locations (unbalanced) 14 14 14 14 
Adjusted R-squared 0.75 0.76 0.75 0.76 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. *** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 1%. 
Newcastle is the omitted location. F-tests reject null-hypotheses bB1=bR1 and bB2=bR2 with 99% confidence. 
White-tests cannot reject null-hypothesis of homoskedasticity. †The unemployment rate of the Greater London 
Area (GLA) is used for all five London markets. ‡The unemployment rate of the GLA is used for the City, the 
West End and the Docklands.  Local unemployment rates are used for Croydon and Hammersmith. 
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TABLE 7 
Explaining the Regulatory Tax—Balanced Sample without Year Fixed Effects 
(Fixed Effects Model, 1973-2005, 11 markets) 
 
 Dependent Variable: Regulatory Tax 
Explanatory Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
-7.920  -7.804   Unemployment rate in local 
office market† (1.930)***  (1.932)***   
 -46.633  -47.466 -46.225 Unemployment rate† * 
business controlled (bB2)  (7.236)***  (7.236)*** (7.333)*** 
 -5.202  -4.967 -4.906 Unemployment rate† * 
resident controlled (bR2)  (1.918)***  (1.918)** (1.919)** 
  1.689 2.388  Service employment growth 
rate   (1.495) (1.438)*  
    -1.172 Service employment growth 
rate * business controlled      (3.715) 
    3.015 Service employment growth 
rate * resident controlled     (1.559)* 
Location Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects No No No No No 
2.208 2.036 2.162 1.967 1.948 
Constant 
(0.252)*** (0.244)*** (0.255)*** (0.247)*** (0.247)*** 
Observations 363 363 363 363 363 
Number of locations 11 11 11 11 11 
Adjusted R-squared 0.75 0.77 0.75 0.77 0.77 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. *** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 1%. F-
tests reject null-hypotheses bB2=bR2 with 99 percent confidence in all cases. White-tests cannot reject the null-
hypothesis of homoskedasticity. †The unemployment rate of the Greater London Area is used for the City of 
London, London West End and London Docklands.  Local unemployment rates are used for Croydon and 
Hammersmith and all other non-London office markets. 
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TABLE 8 
Explaining the Regulatory Tax—Balanced Sample with Year Fixed Effects 
(Fixed Effects Model, 1973-2005, 11 markets) 
 
 
 Dependent Variable: Regulatory Tax 
Explanatory Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
-11.728  -11.735   Unemployment rate in local 
office market† (3.799)***  (3.813)***   
 -55.317  -55.445 -54.041 Unemployment rate† * 
business controlled (bB2)  (7.941)***  (7.957)*** (8.088)*** 
 -10.472  -10.361 -10.091 Unemployment rate† * 
resident controlled (bR2)  (3.603)***  (3.616)*** (3.627)*** 
  -0.041 0.677  Service employment growth 
rate   (1.635) (1.552)  
    -2.640 Service employment growth 
rate * business controlled      (3.753) 
    1.331 Service employment growth 
rate * resident controlled     (1.692) 
Location Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
3.196 2.944 3.198 2.918 2.890 
Constant 
(0.426)*** (0.405)*** (0.430)*** (0.410)*** (0.411)*** 
Observations 363 363 363 363 363 
Number of locations 11 11 11 11 11 
Adjusted R-squared 0.76 0.79 0.76 0.79 0.79 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. *** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 1%. F-
tests reject null-hypotheses bB2=bR2 with 99 percent confidence in all cases. White-tests cannot reject the null-
hypothesis of homoskedasticity. †The unemployment rate of the Greater London Area is used for the City of 
London, London West End and London Docklands.  Local unemployment rates are used for Croydon and 
Hammersmith and all other non-London office markets. 
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TABLE 9 
Explaining the Regulatory Tax—Balanced Sample with Post 1989 Dummy  
(Fixed Effects Model, 1973-2005, 11 markets) 
 
 Dependent Variable: Regulatory Tax 
Explanatory Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
-7.481  -7.426   Unemployment rate in local 
office market† (1.880)***  (1.884)***   
 -46.633  -47.196 -46.225 Unemployment rate† * business 
controlled (bB2)  (7.014)***  (7.028)*** (7.126)*** 
 -4.724  -4.579 -4.534 Unemployment rate† * resident 
controlled (bR2)  (1.861)**  (1.865)** (1.866)** 
  0.914 1.612  Service employment growth 
rate   (1.467) (1.407)  
    -1.172 Service employment growth 
rate * business controlled      (3.611) 
    2.111 Service employment growth 
rate * resident controlled     (1.528) 
0.619 0.629 0.609 0.611 0.606 Dummy variable: Post 1989, all 
markets except City of London (0.136)*** (0.130)*** (0.137)*** (0.131)*** (0.131)*** 
Location Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects No No No No No 
1.880 1.701 1.861 1.663 1.652 
Constant 
(0.255)*** (0.246)*** (0.257)*** (0.248)*** (0.249)*** 
Observations 363 363 363 363 363 
Number of locations 11 11 11 11 11 
Adjusted R-squared 0.76 0.78 0.76 0.78 0.78 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. *** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 1%. F-
tests reject null-hypotheses bB2=bR2 with 99 percent confidence in all cases. White-tests cannot reject the 
null-hypothesis of homoskedasticity. †The unemployment rate of the Greater London Area is used for the 
City of London, London West End and London Docklands.  Local unemployment rates are used for Croydon 
and Hammersmith and all other non-London office markets. 
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TABLE 10 
Explaining the Regulatory Tax—Location Specific Post 1989 Dummies  
(Fixed Effects Model, 1973-2005, balanced sample, 11 markets) 
 
 Dependent Variable: Regulatory Tax 
Explanatory Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
-5.976  -5.926   Unemployment rate in local 
office market† (1.640)***  (1.642)***   
 -22.187  -22.533 -22.144 Unemployment rate† * business 
controlled (bB2)  (6.709)***  (6.723)*** (6.793)*** 
 -4.963  -4.874 -4.856 Unemployment rate† * resident 
controlled (bR2)  (1.677)***  (1.681)*** (1.683)*** 
  0.872 1.095  Service employment growth rate   (1.242) (1.236)  
    -0.134 Service employment growth rate 
* business controlled      (3.158) 
    1.317 Service employment growth rate 
* resident controlled     (1.345) 
-3.877 -3.489 -3.888 -3.494 -3.488 City of London * Post 1989 (0.362)*** (0.392)*** (0.363)*** (0.392)*** (0.393)*** 
1.636 1.612 1.625 1.598 1.595 London West End * Post 1989 (0.362)*** (0.360)*** (0.363)*** (0.360)*** (0.361)*** 
-0.217 -0.239 -0.212 -0.234 -0.233 Croydon * Post 1989 (0.362) (0.360) (0.363) (0.360) (0.360) 
-0.867 -0.864 -0.862 -0.857 -0.855 Reading * Post 1989 (0.360)** (0.358)** (0.361)** (0.358)** (0.358)** 
0.651 0.648 0.646 0.641 0.640 Bristol * Post 1989 (0.360)* (0.358)* (0.361)* (0.358)* (0.358)* 
1.201 1.197 1.184 1.175 1.170 Birmingham * Post 1989 (0.360)*** (0.358)*** (0.362)*** (0.359)*** (0.359)*** 
0.823 0.826 0.803 0.801 0.796 Leeds * Post 1989 (0.360)** (0.358)** (0.362)** (0.359)** (0.360)** 
1.341 1.355 1.326 1.336 1.333 Manchester * Post 1989 (0.361)*** (0.358)*** (0.362)*** (0.359)*** (0.360)*** 
0.379 0.402 0.372 0.394 0.392 Newcastle * Post 1989 (0.362) (0.360) (0.363) (0.360) (0.360) 
1.001 1.014 0.981 0.990 0.985 Edinburgh * Post 1989 (0.361)*** (0.358)*** (0.362)*** (0.359)*** (0.360)*** 
0.297 0.331 0.285 0.317 0.315 Glasgow * Post 1989 (0.365) (0.362) (0.365) (0.363) (0.363) 
Location Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects No No No No No 
1.686 1.620 1.673 1.602 1.598 Constant (0.273)*** (0.272)*** (0.274)*** (0.273)*** (0.273)*** 
Observations 363 363 363 363 363 
Number of locations 11 11 11 11 11 
Adjusted R-squared 0.83 0.84 0.83 0.84 0.84 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. *** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 1%. F-
tests reject null-hypotheses bB2=bR2 with 99 percent confidence in all cases. White-tests cannot reject the null-
hypothesis of homoskedasticity. †The unemployment rate of the Greater London Area is used for the City of 
London, London West End and London Docklands.  Local unemployment rates are used for Croydon and 
Hammersmith and all other non-London office markets. 
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TABLE 11 
Quantitative Effect of Introduction of Uniform Business Rate in 1990  
on a Medium Size Office Firm with 1500m2 Space Usage  
 
 Change in Annual Occupation Cost 
Office Market in 1989 £ in 2005 £ 
London West End 56119 84010 
Croydon 58906 88182 
Reading 44326 66356 
Bristol 42710 63937 
Birmingham 39120 58562 
Leeds 39388 58965 
Manchester 45627 68304 
Newcastle 53401 79942 
Edinburgh 34267 51297 
Glasgow 35781 53564 
Average (all markets) 44964 67312 
Notes: A floor plan of 1500 m2 is typically considered sufficient for up to 200 
employees. The values are calculated by using the coefficient on the dummy variable 
‘Post 1989, all markets except City of London’ reported in Column 5 of Table 9 (most 
conservative estimate). Market specific estimated regulatory tax rates and marginal 
construction cost estimates from Davis Langdon are used for 1989 to compute the 
capitalized value of the effect of the introduction of the Uniform Business Rate in 
1990. Market specific yields from CBRE for 1989 are used to compute annualised 
values. 
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Appendix 
 
Appendix A: Detailed Description of Methodology to Derive 
Marginal Construction Cost 
 
We obtained construction cost data from Davis Langdon. The time-series data 
contains information for all 14 prime office markets and for time periods between 
1961 and 2005. The marginal construction costs are derived from a number of past 
development projects in each of the last five decades (including the 2000s). These 
projects include a number of London and non-London urban office buildings. The 
office development projects in London include: P&O, Euston Square (in the 1960s 
and 1970s), New Bridge St., Appold St. (in the 1980s) and 60 Queen Victoria, 
Greycoat, Premier Place, 140 Aldersgate, 280 Bishopsgate (in the 1990s and 2000s). 
In addition to these projects, Davis Langdon used their ‘1994 Cost Model’ and their 
‘2004 Cost Model’ to derive marginal construction cost for the period from 1990 to 
2005 as appropriately as possible. The non-London urban development projects 
include office buildings in Hampshire, Cheshunt, Croydon, Manchester, Birmingham 
(2 projects) (in the 1960s), Oxford, Bracknell, Halesowen, Warrington, Romford (in 
the 1970s), Hemel Hempstead and Manchester (in the 1980s) and Cardiff, Harlow and 
Egham (in the 1990s). 
 The marginal construction costs (per square meter of office space) were 
calculated for a hypothetical additional top floor on those buildings using standard 
industry value assumptions. The cost elements are listed in Appendix Table A-1 
below. 
 
Appendix Table A-1: Cost Elements 
 
1 Substucture 3C Ceiling Finishes 5L Communication Installations 
Superstructure 4 F&F Services 5M Special Installations 
2A Frame 5A Sanitary Appliances 5N BWIC 
2B Upper Floors 5B Services Equipment 5O Builders Profit 
2C Roof 5C Disposal Installations External Works 
2D Stairs 5D Water Installations 6A Site Works 
2E External Walls 5E Heat Source 6B Drainage 
2F External Windows & Doors 5F Space Heating 6C External Services 
2G Internal Walls 5G Ventilating Systems 6D External Works 
2H Internal Doors 5H Electrical Installations 7 Prelims 
Internal Finishes 5I Gas Installations 8 Contingencies 
3A Wall Finishes 5J Lift Installation  
3B Floor Finishes 5K Protective Installation  
 
Based on the above information, Davis Langdon produced various estimating 
models for (a) London office buildings and (b) non-London office buildings and for 
the various time periods (i.e., (a1) 1960s and 1970s, (a2) 1980s, (a3) 1990s and 2000s; 
(b1) 1960s, (b2) 1970s, (b3) 1980s and (b4) 1990s). Since there was no estimating 
model available for non-London office buildings for the years between 2000 and 
2005, we used the model for the 1990s.  
Finally, the annual construction cost numbers can be derived by using the above 
estimating models and applying Davis Langdon’s total building cost location factors 
(for each of the 14 markets; with outer London having a factor of 1) as well as tender 
price indices between 1961 and 2005. It should be noted that the location factors were 
only available for 1975, 1980, 1985, 1990, 1995, 2000 and 2005. No location factors 
Office space supply restrictions in Britain: the political economy of market revenge 
 
39 
were available prior to 1975, however, the location factors vary relatively little over 
time and hence the location factors for 1975 are used for years prior to 1975. For 
years with missing location factor information, linear trends are assumed. 
 
 
Appendix B:  Imputing Missing Values for Rent-Free Periods 
 
We obtained rent-free period data from CBRE for two markets (the City of 
London and London’s West End) for the years 1993 to 2006. For the remaining years 
and for the other markets we needed to impute the variable.  
A first plot of the data reveals that the rent-free periods at any point in time are 
not only surprisingly different between the City of London and the West End but their 
dynamic and their correlation with trends in rents also differ considerably. The 
negative correlation between the deviation of the observed rent from the trend on the 
one hand and the rent-free period on the other hand is extremely strong and 
statistically highly significant for the City (-0.87) but quite low and not statistically 
significant for the West End (-0.05).19 These stylized facts are consistent with our 
observation that the City office market specializes in the financial service sector, 
which is strongly exposed to general market developments, while the West End 
specialises in sectors that are more protected from general market trends (e.g. the 
media, business and legal services) or that may even have anti-cyclical demand for 
office space (e.g. lobbyists).  
We acknowledge this difference between the two markets and impute the rent-
free periods for the missing years of those two markets using two different estimating 
equations. The rent-free periods in the City of London for years with missing 
observations are estimated as follows: 
 ( )t 0 1 tRent Free Period  = Deviation Trend-Rentβ β ε+ × +   (A1) 
 
The adjusted R2 is 0.73. 
In order to estimate rent-free periods in the West End we estimate a different 
equation that provides a better fit than equation (A1). The estimating equation is as 
follows: 
 ( )t 0 1 tRent Free Period  = Annual Growth in Rentβ β ε+ × +   (A2) 
 
The adjusted R2 is merely .087 but within-sample predictions are all in a 
reasonably narrow band of +/- 5 months, with the majority of predictions being within 
a band of +/- 2 months. 
Finally, for the remaining 12 markets without any rent-free period data we use the 
following equation that is estimated using all available observations with rent-free 
periods (i.e., the City and the West End): 
 ( )jt 0 1 jtRent Free Period  = Deviation Trend-Rent
Dummy West End Year Dummies
β β
ε
+ ×
+ + +  (A3) 
                                                 
19 The idea here is that if demand for office space is high (markets are overheating and rents are above 
the long-term growth path), tenant incentives such as rent-free periods will be quite low. On the other 
hand, if demand for office space is low (markets are in a declining or bust phase and rents are therefore 
below trend) then developers will tend to offer generous incentives (high rent free periods) to attract 
tenants. 
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The adjusted R2 is 0.22. Within sample predictions (for the City and West End) 
suggest that the estimated values may be reasonably good approximations of observed 
rent-free periods. 
 
Appendix C: Imputing Missing Values for Vacancy Rates 
 
We obtained vacancy rate data for relatively short time-series (from 1999 to 
2004) for various U.K. regions (East Midlands, East of England, London, North East, 
North West, South, East, South West, West Midland, Yorkshire & the Humberside) 
from the ODPM. We first geographically matched our 14 local markets to those 
regions. Next, we used national void-rent data from IPD (from 1994 to 2004) to 
impute vacancy rates back until 1994 by assuming that regional vacancy rates moved 
with the national trend between 1994 and 1998. We then imputed the vacancy rates 
for remaining missing observations using the following estimating equation for all 14 
markets: 
 ( )jt 0 1 jtVacancy rate  = Deviation Trend-Rent
Location Dummies Year Dummies
β β
ε
+ ×
+ + +
 (A4) 
 
The adjusted R2 is 0.82. For more than 80 percent of the in-sample observations, 
the measurement error lies well within +/- 1 percentage point; the maximum error is 
roughly +/- 2 percent points. 
 
Appendix D: Imputing Missing Values for Yields  
 
Finally, we also attempted to impute equivalent yields for years prior to 1973. We 
obtained equivalent yield data from CBRE for all our 14 markets, typically from 1973 
until 2005. Similarly to the above imputation method, we estimated the equivalent 
yields as a function of the deviation of rents from the trend, location and year fixed 
effects. The R2 is 0.62. The predicted values imply that yields were higher in the 
1960s and decreased notably around 1973 but this may be the result of a misspecified 
estimating equation. Hence, we are very cautious to interpret results prior to 1973. 
Note that all our results reported in Tables 7 to 11 are based on data from 1973 
onwards and that the comparable results in Table 8 (balanced sample with data from 
1973 onwards and with year fixed effects) are even more supportive of our hypotheses 
than those results reported in Table 6 (unbalanced sample with data from 1961 
onwards and also with year fixed effects). 
 
Appendix E: Methodology Used to Compute Regulatory Tax Values 
for Continental European Cities 
 
We use prime annual rent data and mid-point yield data from JLL for 10 office 
locations across Europe (including the City of London and London West End) to 
compute the ‘hypothetical’ capital value per m2 of a so called ‘Peter Pan building’, 
that is, a building that is constantly renewed. We adjust the value by a scaling factor 
1θ  that is derived as follows: 
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,6 2005
,
1 1999
1 0.6796 7
CBRE central
jt
JLL Peter Pan
j t jt
V
Vθ = == =×
∑ ∑
 (E1) 
 
where ,JLL Peter-PanjtV  is the hypothetical capital value per m
2 of a ‘Peter Pan building’ in 
office market j in year t based on data from JLL and where ,CBRE centraljtV  is the estimated 
actual value of a prime office building in market j in year t based on data from CBRE 
(adjusting for rent-free periods and vacancy rates). The six office markets for which 
we have overlapping data from CBRE and JLL include the City of London, London 
West End, Birmingham, Edinburgh, Leeds and Manchester.  
 
The hypothetical actual property value ,JLL actualjtV  for market j in year t based on JLL 
data can be calculated as follows: 
 
, ,
1
JLL actual JLL Peter Pan
jt jtV Vθ= × . (E2) 
 
 
We use average construction cost data from Gardiner and Theobald’s (2006) 
publication ‘International Construction Cost Survey’. We use another scaling factor 
2θ  to get from average to marginal construction cost. The scaling factor is computed 
as follows: 
 
2 2005
1 1999
2 0.8272 7
DL
jt
GT
j t jt
MCC
ACCθ = == =×
∑ ∑
 (E3) 
 
where DLjtMCC  is the marginal construction cost per m
2 provided by Davis Langdon 
per m2 (for market j and year t) and where GTjtACC is the average construction cost per 
m2 provided by Gardiner and Theobald (2006). The value GTjtACC  is the average of a 
low and a high estimate of average construction costs in a city centre air conditioned 
office building. The office markets that are used to calculate the adjustment factor 2θ  
are the City of London and London West End; this is because the Gardiner and 
Theobald survey only provides construction cost data for London but not for the other 
UK office markets. 
 
The hypothetical marginal construction cost GTjtMCC  for market j in year t based on 
Gardiner and Theobald data can be calculated as follows: 
 
2
GT GT
jt jtMCC ACCθ= × . (E4) 
 
Appendix F: Regulatory Tax Estimates for 14 British Office 
Markets over Time 
 
Figures F1 to F4 illustrate our estimated RT rates for our 14 British office markets 
over time. The four figures combine markets with relative geographical proximity 
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(i.e., London office markets, South East office markets, Midlands and North office 
markets, and Scottish office markets). Note that the RT scales (y-axis) of the four 
figures are different, reflecting the regional differences in the magnitude of RT. 
 
Figure F1: Regulatory Tax (Central Estimate)
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Figure F2: Regulatory Tax (Central Estimate)
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Figure F3: Regulatory Tax (Central Estimate)
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Figure F4: Regulatory Tax (Central Estimate)
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Appendix G: Data Sources and Methodology Used to Calculate the 
Unemployment and Office Employment Growth Rates  
 
Unemployment Rate 
 
Below we describe the methodology used to compute comparable time series for local 
unemployment rates based on the available data sources that necessarily contain 
several structural breaks. First we describe the two primary data sources: the Labour 
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Force Survey (LFS) (Local and Regional) and the Labour Gazette (Local and 
Regional). The LFS is, until 1999, not reliable for spatial units smaller than counties. 
The Gazette and its follow-up publications provide unemployment rates estimates but 
these are for a different concept: registered or claimant counts. Moreover the spatial 
units for which these registration based counts were published changed over time, 
from ‘Office Area’, to Travel to Work Areas and then to Local Authority areas. Our 
task therefore was to find a way of converting ‘count’ based numbers for small areas 
to a consistent survey based concept. We approached this by calculating the ratio of 
the survey based to count based values for the smallest area (always Standard 
Regions) for which both were available and then using this as an adjustment factor to 
convert the small area count-based values to ‘survey equivalents’. We always chose 
the count-based rates for the areas most closely corresponding to the political 
administrative areas of the planning authorities controlling our office locations.  
 
The above describes the general principles. We now explain how we computed our 
unemployment rate time-series in more detail. Finally we briefly describe the methods 
used to compute alternative unemployment rate time-series used to test the sensitivity 
of our results with respect to the unemployment rate estimation method. 
 
1. Data Sources 
 
Labour Force Survey Local 
 
This survey provides unemployment rate data for Birmingham, Bristol, Croydon, 
Hammersmith and Fulham, Leeds, Manchester, Newcastle upon Tyne, Reading, 
Windsor and Maidenhead, Edinburgh and Glasgow. The precise sources used are: 
 
1999-2003: “Local Area Labour Force Survey, District Area Unemployment rate: all 
people aged 16+, Mar-Feb” (www.nomisweb.co.uk) 
 
2004-2005: “Annual Population Survey, District Area Unemployment rate: all people 
aged 16+, Apr-Mar” (www.nomisweb.co.uk) 
 
Labour Force Survey Regional 
 
Prior to the enlargement of the sample, survey-based data were available only at the 
regional level for Greater London, North/Northeast, Northwest, Southeast, Southwest, 
West Midlands, Yorkshire and Humberside and Scotland. The precise sources used 
are: 
 
1973-1977: "Labour Force Survey 1973, 1975 and 1977”. Series LFS no.1 Office of 
population censuses and surveys, London: HMSO. Unemployment rate: all people 
aged 16+. 
 
1979: "Labour Force Survey 1979” Series LFS no.2 Office of population censuses 
and surveys, London: HMSO. Unemployment rate: all people aged 16+. 
 
1981: "Labour Force Survey 1981”. Series LFS no.3 Office of population censuses 
and surveys, London: HMSO.  Unemployment rate: all people aged 16+. 
 
1983: "Labour Force Survey 1983 and 1984”. Series LFS no.4 Office of population 
censuses and surveys, London: HMSO.  Unemployment rate: all people aged 16+. 
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1984-1991: “Labour Force Survey 1984-1991” Table 5.4 Unemployment rates for 
people aged 16+, by region of residence, United Kingdom, Spring 1984-91  
 
1992-2003: “Labour Force Survey Quarterly: Old Unreweighted, Government Office 
Region Unemployment rate: all people aged 16+, Mar-May” (www.nomisweb.co.uk) 
 
2004, 2005: www.nomisweb.co.uk “Annual Population Survey, Government Office 
Region Unemployment rate: all people aged 16+, Jan-Dec” (www.nomisweb.co.uk) 
 
Labour Gazette Regional 
 
This publication provides data for Greater London, North/Northeast, Northwest, 
Southeast, Southwest, West Midlands, Yorkshire and Humberside and Scotland. 
 
We used the April 1960-2005 unemployment rates based on registered unemployed 
and then claimant counts for total unemployed 16+ as a percentage of the total 
workforce. These were reported in the ‘Ministry of Labour Gazette’ 1960-1967; 
continued by the ‘Employment and Productivity Gazette’ 1968-1970; continued by 
the ‘Department of Employment Gazette’ 1971-1978; then in the ‘Employment 
Gazette’ 1979-1995; and finally in ‘Labour Market Trends’ 1996-2005. All five are 
published by the Office for National Statistics. 
 
Labour Gazette Local 
 
This publication provides data relating to the local authority areas of Birmingham, 
Leeds, Bristol, Manchester, Reading, Greater London, Edinburgh, Glasgow, 
Newcastle upon Tyne, Tyneside, North Tyneside, South Tyneside, Slough and 
Berkshire for the month of April between 1960-2005 collected from ‘Ministry of 
Labour Gazette’ 1960-1967; continued by ‘Employment and Productivity Gazette’ 
1968-1970; continued by ‘Department of Employment Gazette’ 1971-1978; continued 
by ‘Employment Gazette’ 1979-1995; continued by ‘Labour Market Trends’ 1996-
2005. A significant discontinuity in the series available for local areas arises from the 
fact that official reporting of the claimant or registered unemployed changed from the 
areas of employment offices to Travel to Work Areas  (corresponding to one or more 
office areas) and then, in 1985, to local authority areas. The Labour Gazette under its 
current title ‘Labour Market Trends’ is published by the Central Statistical Office. 
 
In 2002 the Gazettes switch from publishing employment rates based on “percent 
employee jobs and claimants” to “percent workforce jobs and claimants”. We 
attempted to deal with this structural break by multiplying 2002-2005 local area 
unemployment rates by the following ratio: 
 
%
%
April 2002
April 2002
 Employee jobs & claimants
 Workforce jobs & claimants
= . (G1) 
 
April 1981 unemployment rates were missing for all local areas and so this data point 
was estimated by linearly interpolating the February (March 1981 also missing) and 
May 1981 values. 
 
Maidenhead and Newcastle-Upon-Tyne underwent a series of adjustments due to 
discontinuities in data collection areas and methodology: 
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Maidenhead 
 
To adjust to a survey estimate of the unemployment rate we used the ratio for 
Berkshire but for early years registration/claimant count data was available only for 
Slough. We used registration/claimant count unemployment for the local authority of 
Windsor and Maidenhead when that became available from 1985. Finally, we used 
the LFS unemployment rate for Windsor and Maidenhead between 1999 and 2005, 
again with adjustments to make it comparable with Berkshire. 
 
Newcastle-Upon-Tyne 
 
Data for Newcastle-Upon-Tyne was collected for the Tyneside area between 1962 and 
1978 (adjusted to make it comparable with Newcastle-Upon-Tyne), then for North 
and South Tyneside from 1978 to 1984 (again adjusted), then from Newcastle-Upon-
Tyne (travel to work areas) between 1985 and 2005 (with no adjustments until 1998). 
The boundary definition of Newcastle-Upon-Tyne changed to “counties, unitary 
authorities, local authority districts” in 1999. We make a final adjustment for 
unemployment rates between 1999 and 2005 to reflect this change in boundary 
definition. 
 
2. Methodology Used to Compute Local Unemployment Rates Used  
in the Regression Analysis 
 
We use the Greater London unemployment rate for all 5 London office markets (City, 
West End, Docklands, Hammersmith, Croydon) in columns 1 and 2 of Table 6 
(unemployment rate “measure 1”). For columns 3 and 4 of Table 6 and for Tables 7-
10 we use local unemployment rates for Hammersmith and Croydon (unemployment 
rate “measure 2).  
 
We use different methods to compile consistent unemployment rate time-series for (i) 
local office markets outside London and (ii) the inner-London office markets of 
Hammersmith and Croydon. The methods are described below. 
 
Local Office Markets outside London (“Local Areas”) 
 
We use actual LFS local area (not including Intra-London areas, see below) from 
1999 to 2005. 
 
Hypothetical LFS local area unemployment rates between 1960 and 1998 were 
estimated by assuming that the ratio between LFS and Labour Gazette regional 
claimant count/registered unemployment for each year was identical to the 
corresponding ratio between the hypothesized LFS and Labour Gazette local area 
claimant count/registered rates. This was done as follows for local area j in region r 
and year t: 
 
rt
jrtjrt
rt
LFS regionalHypothetical LFS local Gazette local Gazette regional
= × . (G2) 
 
Prior to 1977, as well as 1978, 1980, 1982 we have no data on LFS regional 
unemployment. In order to estimate this data the ratios between the regional LFS and 
Labour Gazette claimant count/registered unemployment rates for the month of 
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April20 are calculated for the existing LFS years. For the years in which LFS data does 
not exist, the April LFS regional / Gazette claimant count/registration regional ratios 
on either side of the missing years are linearly interpolated and then multiplied by the 
regional Labour Gazette claimant count/registration rates for the missing year to 
estimate the missing LFS values. 
 
For years prior to 1977, the 1977 LFS / Labour Gazette claimant count/registration 
ratio is used to estimate hypothetical annual LFS values from Labour Gazette 
claimant count/registration unemployment rates for 1960-1976. 
 
Intra-London Office Markets  
 
We use actual LFS Greater London area or local area unemployment rates from 1999 
to 2005. 
 
The Labour Gazette has never produced local area unemployment rates for intra-
London areas, and although the LFS began publishing intra-London unemployment 
rates from 1992, it appears that these statistics are not reliable prior to 1999. Therefore 
in order to produce intra-London unemployment rates prior to 1999, a hypothetical 
intra-London unemployment rate was created by multiplying the LFS Greater London 
(1977-1998) and hypothetical LFS Greater London (1960-1976) unemployment rates 
with the variation from the mean of intra-London areas in 1999. For example, for 
intra-London area j and year t: 
 
1999
jtjt
1999
= × LFS intra-LondonHypothetical LFS intra-London LFS Greater London LFS Greater London
. (G3) 
 
We use actual LFS Greater London area unemployment rates from 1978 to 2005. For 
years prior to 1977, we use the hypothetical LFS values (described above). 
 
We bridge the years 1998 and 1999 (and adjust all years prior 1998) by assuming that 
the actual LFS values for 1999 and the imputed relative changes in unemployment 
rates prior to 1999 are accurate. 
 
3. Methodologies Used to Compute Alternative Unemployment Rate Measures 
 
In an attempt to assess the sensitivity of our results with respect to the methodology 
chosen to compute the unemployment rates, we calculated three sets of alternative 
unemployment rate measures (again two measures based on different assumptions 
about the relevant unemployment rate in Hammersmith and Croydon). The first 
method is to calculate hypothetical LFS unemployment rates for all years but not 
using actual LFS local area unemployment rates from 1999 to 2005. The second 
method is identical to the method described above except that hypothetical LFS 
values are used without bridging the structural break for years prior to 1999. The third 
method is again identical to the method described above except that for the five 
London markets and prior to 1999 we use hypothetical rather than actual GLA 
unemployment rates for the period between 1977 and 1998. 
 
 
                                                 
20 Only April is used for Labour Gazette claimant count/registration unemployment rates because the 
LFS unemployment survey is generally conducted in April. 
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Service Employment Growth Rate 
 
We constructed two alternative indexes of total employment in office employing 
sectors. The first time-series index is based on a broad definition; all service 
employment in the 1968 industrial classification. The second series is based on a 
narrower definition which excludes the category ‘distribution, hotels and restaurants’, 
which is not primarily office employment.  
 
All employment data is derived from NOMIS, which provides data for various 
geographical levels of aggregation, from 1971 until 2005. There have been three 
significant changes in industrial classification since 1971 affecting local area 
employment statistics, with a bridge year available for each classification. We derive 
employment data for ‘Job Centres as of 1985’ for the time period between 1972 and 
1981. The remaining data (1981-2005) relates to the ‘Local Authority District’ (LAD) 
level.21 Data for the period between 1981 and 1991 is based on the 1984 SIC, while 
the remaining data for the period between 1991 and 2005 is based on the 1992 SIC. 
We used the overlapping years to construct a consistent index. Unfortunately, data is 
missing for 10 years in total (1979, 1980, 1982, 1983, 1985, 1986, 1990, 1992 and 
1994), hence, we had to impute employment numbers for the missing years. We 
experimented with two alternative methods; using linear approximations and infilling 
missing years based on national data (since regional data, unfortunately, were also not 
available for the years with missing local data).22 It turned out that the latter method, 
while theoretically more appealing, confronted us with the issue that during some time 
periods some local markets observed a decrease (increase) in service employment, 
while the national service employment numbers moved in the opposite direction. 
Similarly, the imputed local employment numbers can vary significantly if the local 
employment numbers move only a little over the observed time periods, while the 
movements at national level over the same time period are significant. Hence, we 
opted for the former method but should note that results are very similar when we use 
the latter method and merely use linear approximations for the few time periods with 
employment movements in opposite directions. Results are available from the authors 
upon request. 
 
The service employment growth rates can be calculated as follows: 
 
S S
j,t j,t-1
jt S
j,t-1
E E
=S E
−
 (G4) 
 
where jtS equals the local office employment growth rate in local office market j in 
year t and where Sj,tE  denotes the total service employment index. 
 
                                                 
21 For 1981 – the overlapping year – we use the Job Centre or a combination of Job Centres that best 
approximates the employment numbers for the corresponding LAD.  
22 National data is derived from the Labour Gazette. 
